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I. INTRODUCTION
To the outside observer, and even perhaps to those involved, cases
involving a tribal entity and a non-tribal one may look like ordinary
business dealings. For example, the tribal company involved may do
construction, operate resorts, or anything else a non-tribal corporation
might do. In one case, for instance, a corporation contracted to deliver
goods onto a reservation and then receive payment.I Payment never
came, and the goods were not returned. When the corporation, United
Linings, Inc., sued in state court, the suit was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the company.2 So it sued in tribal court,3 only to be
1. See United Linings, Inc. v. Vi-ikam Doag Indus., Inc., No. 324116 (Ariz.
Super. Ct. July 13, 1998).
2. In fact, an assertion of sovereign immunity may defeat a state's subject matter
jurisdiction. This is because a state or even a federal court cannot assert jurisdiction over
a sovereign entity, even if it may have the proper personal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). There, the Court held that the state court was
without subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a lawsuit fied by a non-Indian trader
against an on-reservation Indian couple for a debt allegedly incurred on the reservation.
"There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
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confronted with an impenetrable wall: sovereign immunity.' The lawsuit
could not proceed, and legal costs quickly overcame the amount due on
the contract.5 Justice Stevens refers to such an immunity rule as
"strikingly anomalous"' and the doctrine behind it as an "anachronistic
fiction."7
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." Id. at 223. See also United
States v. Land, Shelby County, 45 F.3d 397, 398 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995); Shanbaum v.
United States, 32 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1994); Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh
Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1993); Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d 948, 951 (9th
Cir. 1991); McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1052 (1989).
3. See United Linings, Inc. v. Vi-ikam Doag Indus., Inc., No. 98-C-7354 (Tohono
O'odham Tribal Ct. 1998). Although the actual disposition of the case in the Judicial
Court of the Tohono O'odham Nation is unknown, it is certain that Vi-ikam Doag (VDI)
again asserted its sovereign immunity defense. Following this asserted defense, United
Linings (ULI) filed a Motion for Reconsideration in state court, claiming that it had been
misled. ULI claimed that VDI had mislead it into filing suit in tribal court by stating that
a non-state court remedy was available, since tribal court was the proper place for the
suit to be heard. ULI seems to have assumed that the sovereign immunity defense would
not be asserted there. However, VDI responded:
VDI did not mislead this Court in any way. VDI's position regarding
jurisdiction and sovereign immunity has not changed. VDI strongly protests
the charge that it somehow "whipsawed" ULI or did anything else
improper....
" VDI noted.., that ULI's remedy was to "bring this action in the
Tohono O'odham Tribal Court." VDI, however, neither represented nor
implied that if ULI sued it in Tribal Court, VDI would withdraw or waive its
sovereign immunity defense.
VDI's Response and Objection to ULI's Motion for Reconsideration at 2, 4, United
Linings, Inc. v. Vi-ikam Doag Indus., Inc. (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1998) (No. 324116) (citation
omitted).
4. Sovereign immunity is
[a] judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government
without its consent. Founded on the ancient principle that "the King can do no
wrong," it bars holding the government or its political subdivisions liable for
the torts of its officers or agents unless such immunity is expressly waived by
statute or by necessary inference from legislative enactment.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
5. One brief stated that "[tihe Defendant's attorneys seek $29,506.89 for
attending a provisional remedy hearing, making a Motion to Dismiss and arguing that
motion. All of that was done in a case where the prayer for relief that the Plaintiff seeks
is approximately $32,000.00." Response and Opposition to Defendant's Application for
Attorney's Fees and Costs at 3, United Linings, Inc. v. Vi-ikam Doag Indus., Inc. (Ariz.
Super. Ct. 1998) (No. 324116).
6. Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 765 (1998) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
7. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 514 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity.8 The doctrine of tribal
immunity also "extends to individual tribal officials acting in their
representative capacity and within the scope of their authority."9 Tribes
may create commercial enterprises that, for all intents and purposes, look
like normal corporations. They have a charter and may have a "sue-or-
be-sued" provision. However, such provisions are not necessarily self-
executing." Thus, the corporation itself may enjoy sovereign immunity,
and suits against it will be dismissed. Congress has authority under the
"Indian Commerce Clause" to control the field of Indian law, including
waiving sovereignty." Thus, unless the corporation or Congress
explicitly waives this immunity for a particular contract,'3 the
corporation cannot be sued in state, federal, or even tribal court.
Waivers rarely occur. 4 Therefore, there is no remedy for potential
8. See, e.g., FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 324-28 (1982).
See also DAVID H. GETCHEs & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 383-88 (4th ed. 1998).
9. Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476,479 (9th Cir. 1985).
10. "Sue-or-be-sued" provisions are exactly that: a provision in a corporation's
charter or articles of incorporation stating that nothing shall limit the ability of the
corporation to sue or be sued. While on its face such a provision makes it sound as if the
corporation is consenting to "be sued," many courts hold that this merely entities the
corporation to waive immunity in contracts if it so desires. See, e.g., Boe v. Fort
Belknap Indian Community, 455 F. Supp. 462 (D. Mont. 1978); Atkinson v. Haldane,
569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977). For a more complete description of such provisions, and
waiver in general, see WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL
91-95 (3d ed. 1998); Scott D. Danahy, Comment, License to Discriminate: The
Application of Sovereign Immunity to Employment Discrimination Claims Brought by
Non-Native American Employees of Tribally Owned Businesses, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
679, 681-82 (1998); Steve E. Dietrich, Comment, Tribal Businesses and the Uncertain
Reach of Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Statutory Solution, 67 WASH. L. REv. 113, 127-
28 (1992) (stating that "sue or be sued" provision in an ordinance can be an effective
waiver).
11. See Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 720 P.2d 499, 501, 507
(Ariz. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986). Also, note that the same rule applies to
corporations owned by the federal government. "For a corporation or agent owned by
the federal government, the lack of a 'sue-or-be-sued' clause does not mean that
sovereign immunity has been retained." Brian C. Lake, Note, The Unlimited Sovereign
Immunity of Indian Tribal Businesses Operating Outside the Reservation: An Idea
Whose Time Has Gone, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 87, 112 & n.115 (1996).
12. Congress may "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. Waivers are strictly construed. Waivers "cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1977)
(quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v.
King, 395 U.S. 14 (1969))). "Courts test asserted waivers of sovereign immunity of the
kind claimed here against an exacting standard." Chance v. Coquille Indian Tribe, 963
P.2d 638, 639 (Or. 1998). See also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986).
14. One scholar has noted that "[d]espite market pressures, most tribes have
chosen not to waive their sovereign immunity in commercial dealings." Lake, supra
note 11, at 101.
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victims.
This situation is exacerbated because such tribal corporations engage
in the sorts of activities for which non-tribal corporations may normally
be sued. Their employees may, for example, drive trucks off
reservations and get into accidents . 5 The tribally-owned corporation
may issue promissory notes and then refuse to pay them back;6 operate a
poorly-marked off-reservation marina park that caters to non-Indians;17
and operate ski lodges." While many of the corporations retain the
names of their tribal owners, some have names like Mt. Adams
Furniture,9 Capital International Bank & Trust,2 Clipper Seafoods Co.,
Pequot Pharmaceutical Network, and Picopa Construction Co.21 In
addition, many tribes are represented by non-tribal management
companies in their business dealings. Therefore, many non-tribal
businesses may not even realize they are doing business with an Indian
entity, much less a sovereign one."
The issue of sovereign immunity is becoming an increasingly
important one as tribes that were traditionally impoverished and isolated
reach out and do business around the country. On the one hand, tribes
have been focusing on a few, specific businesses "includ[ing] ski resorts,
gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians." 3 But more recently,
as the 1998 Supreme Court case of Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc.2 notes, the "modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises
extend[] well beyond traditional tribal customs and activities."5 This
creates some initial difficulties. Non-tribal corporations may be hesitant
15. See Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1108-12, 1116 (Ariz. 1989)
(denying corporation immunity because it was not a subordinate economic organization).
16. See Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998)
(holding that an economic development agency had immunity).
17. See Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421, 424 (Ariz. 1968)
(holding that tribe had immunity for off-reservation commercial activity).
18. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973) (holding
that notwithstanding tribal sovereignty, tribe was subject to non-discriminatory state
laws with respect to off-reservation commercial activity).
19. See Richardson (In re Greene) v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.
1992).
20. See Burnham v. Pequot Pharm. Network, No. CV 95536264, 1998 WL 345463
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 1998).
21. See Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104 (Ariz. 1989); see also Lake,
supra note 11, at 102 n.77.
22. See Lake, supra note 11, at 101-02.
23. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
24. Id. at751.
25. Id. at 757-58.
to do business with tribal corporations, which themselves may be
hesitant to give up the powerful tool of sovereign immunity.26 Non-
tribal corporations also face complex jurisdictional issues27 and may be
required to sue in tribal court.'
The situation was heightened by the recent Kiowa Supreme Court
case, in which the Court extended the doctrine to its current state in
holding that a tribally-owned corporation retains its sovereign immunity,
even when it conducts non-tribally related commercial transactions off
the reservation.29 Some commentators, and even some Supreme Court
justices, had predicted that the doctrine would not extend this far. The
Court, in a six to three decision, even stated, "There are reasons to doubt
the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine."'" In fact, Justice Kennedy,
who wrote the opinion for the majority, spends much of the argument
tearing the doctrine down, yet retaining it on the sole principle that
Congress has yet to speak clearly on the topic.32 This leaves the Court
open to criticism: why extend a doctrine that may well be "harmiful]" 33
and "anachronistic"34?
In spite of such "doubt," businesses and ordinary people will find
themselves running up against the doctrine more and more in the future.
This Comment argues that Kiowa was wrong in widening the doctrine in
this way, an expansion that is already being followed in courts
throughout the country. Part II explores the Kiowa doctrine and what it
means, and also argues against further expansion of the doctrine,
26. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also Danahy, supra note 10, at
700 (on waiving sovereign immunity); Charles R. Zeh & Treva J. Hearne, Development
Considerations on Indian Lands, 13 NAT. REsouRcEs & ENv'T 350, 351-52, 371 (1998)
(citing a specific example of a tribe creating a corporation that waives its immunity, so
that the tribe itself can maintain its own immunity).
27. See generally John W. Gillingham, Pathfinder: Tribal, Federal, and State
Court Subject Matter Jurisdictional Bounds: Suits Involving Native American Interests,
18 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 73 (1993); Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The
Confusing Parameters of State, Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 539 (1997).
28. See Reynolds, supra note 27, at 540-51, 598-601. Such jurisdictional issues,
however, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
29. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760.
30. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
498 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 178 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (writing
separately to express his "doubts ... about the continuing vitality in this day of the
doctrine of tribal immunity as it was enunciated in United States v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940)"); Lake, supra note 11; Thomas P. McLish, Note,
Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible Limits, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 173
(1988).
31. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
32. See id. at 759-60.
33. Id. at 758.
34. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J. concurring).
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limiting it, for example, in a manner recommended by an Arizona
Supreme Court case, Dixon v. Picopa Construction Co.5 This is
particularly important given the areas sovereign immunity affects,
particularly commercial transactions, employment, and tort litigation.
Part III shows that such immunity is inconsistent with the changing
nature of sovereignty recognized by the federal government and by the
states, and perhaps throughout the world. Part IV will outline the
arguments raised for and against the necessity and legality of the
doctrine, and Part V will outline some recommendations for businesses,
courts, individuals, and Congress.
II. KIOWA AND ITS RECENT LEGACY
A. The Case, Its Holding, and Its Effects
On May 26, 1998, the United States Supreme Court handed down a
decision 36 which set the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity for off-
reservation commercial activities in stone until Congress may choose to
change it.37 The facts were relatively simple. The tribe had formed an
industrial development commission, which agreed to buy stock from the
plaintiff. The commission issued a promissory note in the tribe's name.
The tribe then defaulted; plaintiff sued, and ultimately lost when the
tribe asserted sovereign immunity.8 Plaintiff had argued that immunity
35. 772 P.2d 1104 (Ariz. 1989).
36. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 751.
37. The doctrine of sovereign immunity for tribal corporations had already
received support from a number of cases, including Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991); Sac and Fox Nation v.
Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 810 (1995); Richardson
(In re Greene) v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1039 (1994); Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1968).
See CANBY, supra note 10, at 89.
38. Kiowa is actually just one in a series of cases that made their way through state
and federal courts arising from promissory notes the tribe gave to purchase all stock in
Clinton-Sherman Aviation, Inc. Related suits include Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe, 909 P.2d
59 (Okla. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188 (1996) (no sovereign immunity for off-
reservation contracts); Aircraft Equipment Co. v. Kiowa Tribe, 921 P.2d 359 (Okla.
1996); Aircraft Equipment Co. v. Kiowa Tribe, 939 P.2d 1143 (Okla. 1997), vacated, 524
U.S. 901 (1998); and Kiowa Tribe v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 1998) (allowing
the tribe federal relief from state court actions against it). There are other unreported
cases arising out of the same matter. See Kiowa Tribe v. Hoover, 150 F.3d at 1166 n.2
& 1167 n.7.
should not apply when the tribal entity was involved in a commercial
venture off the reservation. 9  Plaintiff argued in the alternative that
conducting commercial activities off tribal lands constituted a waiver.4
The Court asserted, "[tlo date, our cases have sustained tribal immunity
from suit without drawing a distinction based on where the tribal
activities occurred."4' The Court stated further, "[n]or have we yet
drawn a distinction between governmental and commercial activities of
a tribe."42 The manner in which these two issues were resolved in Kiowa
served to extend tribal sovereign immunity beyond its prior state by
permitting tribes to create corporations that can engage in non-
governmental business off the reservation and to avoid being sued for
any of their acts. No contracts can be enforced against such corporations
if they have not waived their immunity. Certainly, the immediate upshot
of this is that one should be careful accepting promissory notes from
corporations owned by the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma. Obviously,
however, given the number of tribes and their far-reaching business
activities, this has greater potential than that indicated in one case to
cause harm.
For example, immediately after Kiowa, other courts, bound by Kiowa,
have held tribal corporations immune from suit under similar
circumstances.43 While several of the cases involve employment issues,
their holdings are based on the same rationales in Kiowa regarding
immunity for off-reservation commercial activity. In Burnham v.
Pequot Pharmaceutical Network," for instance, the plaintiff sought to
sue his employer and his superiors when he was fired from his job as a
pharmacist at PRxN. Pequot Pharmaceutical Network is a tribal entity
39. See Brief for Respondent, Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S.
751 (1998) (No. 96-1037), 1997 WL 597299, at *4-9 (Sept. 26, 1997).
40. See id. at *10-13.
41. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754.
42. Id. at 754-55.
43. See, e.g., Ute Distrib. Corp. v. Ute Indian Tribe, 149 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir.
1998); Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that sovereign immunity barred personal injury action stemming from fight in
casino parking lot, since it extended to for-profit corporation formed to operate casino
and to officers and agents of Tribe); Burnham v. Pequot Pharn. Network, No. CV
95536264, 1998 WL 345463 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 1998); Thompson v. Crow Tribe
of Indians, 962 P.2d 577 (Mont. 1998); Chance v. Coquille Indian Tribe, 963 P.2d 638
(Or. 1998). But see TTEA v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, No. 98-50582, WL 507508 (5th
Cir. July 19, 1999) (in on-reservation contract action, holding that Kiowa sovereign
immunity only applies to suits for damages, not suits for injunctive relief, but finding
lack of subject matter jurisdiction barred claim in federal court); Ninigret Dev. Corp. v.
Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 32 F. Supp. 2d 497 (D.R.I. 1999) (in
contract dispute, distinguishing Kiowa because waiver may have occurred, allowing state
court to hear that issue).
44. No. CV 95536264, 1998 WL 345463 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 1998).
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that operates PRxN as a for-profit business off the reservation in
Connecticut. PRxN does no business on the reservation. Despite
Burnham's allegations that he had been guaranteed a "secure" position
and grievance procedures by the employee handbook, the suit against the
tribal entity was dismissed in light of Kiowa. Meanwhile, Burnham was
permitted to maintain his suit against individual defendants, since he had
alleged that they had acted beyond the scope of their authority.
Interestingly, all of the other defendants, Burnham's superiors, were
Connecticut residents who were not tribal members.45 If they were
deemed to have acted within the scope of their authority, it appears they
too would enjoy the tribe's immunity.46
In another case, Chance v. Coquille Indian Tribe,47 another
employment-related matter ended without reaching the merits of the
claim. Chance was hired by the president of a corporation owned by the
tribe, and sued when he was fired. Despite various waiver theories
advanced by the plaintiff, the tribe claimed immunity in light of Kiowa
and won. The corporation's own charter said that the corporation could
consent to be sued. Furthermore, the employment contract itself stated,
"CEDCO and the Coquille Indian Tribe grant limited sovereign
immunity only for the enforceability of this contract., 4' The
corporation's president himself intended this to be a waiver, and was
himself a tribal spokesman authorized to enter into contracts on the
corporation's behalf. However, the court held that, since he had not
been given authority to waive immunity, he could not have done so.
Approval by the corporation's board of directors was required. 49
In Calvello v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,0 the manager of a gaming casino
sued when he was fired, but the claim was dismissed in light of Kiowa.
The contract contained an arbitration clause; however, the contract had
only been approved by the Tribal Chairman. According to the tribe's
constitution, such contracts must be approved by the General Council,
which is composed of all adult members of the tribe. The tribe, via its
45. See id. at *5 n.7.
46. The court stated that "[t]he doctrine of tribal immunity 'extends to individual
tribal officials acting within their representative capacity and within the scope of their
authority."' Id. at *4 (quoting Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D. Conn.
1996), aft'd, 114 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Hardin v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1985))).
47. 963 P.2d 638 (Or. 1998).
48. Id. at 640.
49. See id. at 640-41.
50. 584 N.W.2d 108 (S.D. 1998).
Chairman and its Tribal Counsel, even participated in arbitration.
However, the court held that this did not bind the tribe since it had not
approved the action. Even the gaming compact with the state was held
not to have waived tribal immunity for this action.'
In Strader v. Verant,52 when gamblers tried to sue state officials
alleging breach of a duty to enforce anti-gambling statutes, the entire
claim was dismissed when the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that
Indian tribes were indispensable parties that could not be joined because
of sovereign immunity under Kiowa and other cases. 3 Thus, the action
was dismissed. In Thompson v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 4 the tribe itself
had filed tax liens off the reservation against an individual who owned a
business on the reservation. That individual attempted to fight the liens,
but the court held that tribal immunity had not been waived, even by
initiation of proceedings off the reservation 5
Obviously, Kiowa has had wide-ranging effects in various areas, and
will continue to do so in the future. Before considering all the areas into
which Kiowa may reach, it is first important to explore the significance
of the sovereign immunity doctrine itself.
B. The Nature of the Sovereign Immunity at Issue Here:
Off-Reservation, Commercial Activity
It is critical to frame the particular nature of the grant of sovereign
immunity at issue in Kiowa. In such an instance as that presented in
Kiowa, a tribe creates a corporation to conduct off-reservation business
of any sort. That corporation then claims sovereign immunity to any
actions brought against it. This is particularly significant because the
corporate entity and the sovereign entity are distinct, yet the tribe's
sovereign status attaches to the corporation. In the case of Kiowa, the
corporation was a tribal economic development council, but, in other
cases, the corporation is a purely for-profit enterprise having nothing to
do with tribal self-governance. These corporations, therefore, are
completely independent bodies, doing business in the territory of another
sovereign. This would seem to justify a ruling that no sovereign
immunity exists.56
51. See id. at 110-16.
52. 964 P.2d 82 (N.M. 1998).
53. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476
U.S. 877 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1989).
54. 962 P.2d 577 (Mont. 1998).
55. See id. at 581-82.
56. For the application of this idea to states, see Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,
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The Kiowa immunity is so startling not only because of its possible
effects on those who come in contact with the tribe,57 but also because it
appears to directly contravene prior Supreme Court leanings and policy,
For example, in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones," the Court held that
activities conducted by the Mescalero Band off the reservation were
subject to non-discriminatory state taxes. 9 In a concurring opinion in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, Justice
Stevens pointed out, "[n]evertheless, I am not sure that the rule of tribal
sovereign immunity extends to cases arising from a tribe's conduct of
commercial activity outside its own territory.'M In fact, the majority in
Potawatomi went to great lengths to show that there was no distinction
between activities on a reservation, which is the typical scenario, and the
facts of the case, in which the activity occurred on trust land.62 Had the
Court believed that the on-reservation/off-reservation distinction was
irrelevant, as it did in Kiowa, it need not have even bothered with the
reservation/trust land distinction. Furthermore, the conduct in both
Turner v. United States63 and United States v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co.,' two of the most important cases on tribal sovereign
immunity, involved conduct that had occurred on the reservation, not
416-427 (1979) (holding that states retain their sovereignty only in their own courts; a
state cannot claim immunity in another state's courts for torts committed in that state).
57. See infra Part II.C., where such instances are considered.
58. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
59. See id. at 148-49. This point was raised during oral argument in Kiowa Tribe
v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. See Oral Argument of R. Brown Wallace, Esq., On
Behalf of the Petitioner, Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998)
(No. 96-1037), 1998 WL 15116, at *9-10 (Jan. 12, 1998).
60. 498 U.S. 505 (1991). In Potawatomi, Oklahoma levied a tax on cigarettes sold
on land held in trust for the tribe. However, the tribe had never collected the tax. When
the State demanded payment, the tribe sued to enjoin relief, and the State counterclaimed
to enjoin future sales unless the tribe collected the tax. The Court, in finding the tribe
immune from suit, held that although the State could levy such a tax against
nonmembers of the tribe, it could not force the tribe to collect the tax. See id. at 505.
61. Id. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring).
62. See id. at 512. Trust land refers to land held in trust for an Indian tribe by the
federal government. It may include both reservation and off-reservation land. In this
case, the Court held that the distinction between trust land and reservation land was
irrelevant for the purposes of sovereign immunity; rather, the significance was "whether
the area has been 'validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the
superintendence of the Government."' Id. at 511. The Court held that any land held in
trust had been "'validly set apart' and thus qualifies as a reservation for tribal immunity
purposes." Id. (citations omitted).
63. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
64. 309 U.S. 506 (1940) [hereinafter USF&G].
off.
65
Providing sovereign immunity for commercial activity seems contrary
to current sovereignty law. For example, distinctions are made for
foreign governments, states, and the federal government when they enter
the commercial arena."
C. Trouble Areas: Places that This Will Reach
Such a broad immunity for tribal entities will have a significant impact
in many areas. The first and most obvious impact concerns commercial
ventures like the one in Kiowa. What if the more than 320 federally
recognized tribes each sent tribal corporations into each of the fifty
states to do business, free from the fears of lawsuits?67 With a majority
of the states now home to high stakes tribally-owned casinos, the
possibilities for business problems are endless."
Immunity has far-reaching implications in other areas as well.
Employees of such corporations will be unable to sue, for example, for
sexual harassment. Tort claims become impossible under these
circumstances. 0 Waiver is not available in tort claims, and potential
65. For further discussion of these two cases, see infra Part III.B.1. See also
Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 762 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that Turner and USF&G involved on-reservation conduct).
66. See infra Part llI.A.1-3 for more on commercial distinctions for foreign, state
and federal governmental entities. See also McLish, supra note 30, at 191.
67. This possibility is suggested by John E. Patterson, Jr., counsel for respondent
in Kiowa, in his oral argument. See Oral Argument of John E. Patterson, Jr., On Behalf
of the Respondent, Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (No. 96-1037), 1998 WL 15116, at *30
(Jan. 12, 1998).
68. See, e.g., Stephanie Dean, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should the Federal
Government Be Able to Tax Native American Gambling Revenue?, 32 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 157, 158 (1999); Nicholas S. Goldin, Note, Casting a New Light on Casino
Gaming: Why Congress Should Curtail the Scope of High Stakes Indian Gaming, 84
CORNELLL. REV. 798, 800 (1999).
69. See, e.g., Burnham v. Pequot Pharm. Network, No. CV 95536264, 1998 WL
345463 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 1998) (in non-sexual harassment case, wrongful
termination claim dismissed, demonstrating that suing tribal employers under other
circumstances such as for sexual harassment would be impossible); see also Danahy,
supra note 10 (discussing sexual harassment and other employment cases); Lake, supra
note 11, at 104 & 105 n.88 (citing Gavle v. Little Si, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that tribal corporation was immune from suit for sexual harassment,
pregnancy and race discrimination, civil rights violations, and other torts)).
70. As Justice Kennedy noted, "In this economic context, immunity can harm
those who are unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal
immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims." Kiowa,
523 U.S. at 758 (emphasis added).
For a detailed exploration of tort claims, see Danahy, supra note 10, at 700 n.198
(citing several accidents on reservations, reported in an LA. Times article, in which
sovereign immunity caused dismissal of the claims). See also Lake, supra note 11, at
105 n.87; Alan Abrahamson, Tribes' Immunity Sparks Criticism, L.A. TIMES, July 29,
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victims may have insufficient notice that they are dealing with immune
entities. Although a victim could sue the individual at fault, say, in a
trucking or boating accident, the doctrine- of respondeat superior is
inapplicable. In Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe' a child was
killed at a marina owned by the tribe. The parents could not sue the tribe
for alleged poor demarcation lines." If a tribal corporation employee
drove a truck off the reservation and was involved in an accident, the
tribe would enjoy immunity. Respondeat superior would again be
defeated. Slip and fall accidents are inevitable at casinos" and
construction sites, yet there would be little recourse for injured patrons
or workers. Justice Stevens seems particularly concerned about the
plight of tort victims, as evidenced in his dissent in Kiowa:
[T]he rule is unjust. This is especially so with respect to tort victims who have
no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of sovereign immunity; yet nothing in
the Court's reasoning limits the rule to lawsuits arising out of voluntary
contractual relationships. Governments, like individuals, should pay7$eir debts
and should be held accountable for their unlawful, injurious conduct.
Immunity also creates some procedural difficulties, especially
considering rules on compulsory jurisdiction and indispensable parties.
For example, if a tribe were to sue an individual or an entity, and there
was a compulsory counterclaim, that claim could not be asserted. While
lawsuits have in some instances been held to waive immunity, this is far
from a settled issue. In a case following Kiowa, plaintiffs sued a number
of defendants over gambling issues. The tribes were held to be
indispensable parties to the action, but could not be joined because they
enjoyed sovereign immunity, and so the whole claim was dismissed."
There are also bankruptcy ramifications,71 commerce clause issues,"
1991, at A3.
71. 443 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1968).
72. See id.; see also Lake, supra note 11, at 105 n.87; McLish, supra note 30, at
173.
73. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
450-458 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997), covers such claims. It requires tribes to carry liability
insurance. See id. § 450f(c)(3).
74. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 766 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. See Strader v. Verant, 964 P.2d 82 (N.M. 1998).
76. See Richardson (In re Greene) v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 980 F.2d 590, 598 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding tribe immune from suit by bankruptcy trustee for off-reservation
commercial activity in operation of furniture store).
77. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 153-54 (1982) (holding
that tribe-imposed tax did not violate the commerce clause).
and anti-trust potential. The effect on water rights is unknown.78 There
may be serious ramifications for cross-boundary nuisance, such as
pollution or lights from casinos. A tribe may in such instances be acting
from within its own boundaries, although the effects of its activities are
off-reservation. Yet immunity would be retained and the state might be
powerless. Or what if, for example, a wealthy tribe formed a large,
national corporation that started acquiring off-reservation businesses?
Would those corporations get the immunity too? Or perhaps wealthy,
non-Indian businesses can strike deals with tribes to cover their
corporations with the immunity blanket. These questions remain
unsettled.
Furthermore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a virtual
"Pandora's Box" for states in their dealings with tribes, as tribes may be
able to override or ignore state law. The problems arising from Kiowa
were hinted at in an earlier case, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe.79 In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,"0
the Court held that states could tax tribal corporations doing business off
the reservation.8 In Potawatomi, however, the Supreme Court indicated
that although states could assess taxes on tribes under certain
circumstances, they might be powerless to collect the taxes because of
the tribe's sovereign immunity.82 This appears to go against the Court's
landmark holding in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,83 i.e., that the
jurisdiction to regulate, and specifically the jurisdiction to tax, provides
jurisdiction to enforce that tax."'
Such immunity gives rise to potential nightmares. For example,
during petitioner's oral argument in Kiowa, the Supreme Court posed an
interesting hypothetical: "[S]uppose the tribe goes [to] downtown Tulsa
and they buy a piece of property and open an office, and the taxes are
$4,000 a year, and they don't pay, right. Can the city or the State sue the
tribe and get the taxes?"85 Both the Justice and counsel for petitioner
agreed that neither the state nor the city could bring the tribe, or its
corporation, to court to collect the taxes. Another question posed further
78. For a succinct description of water rights issues, see CANBY, supra note 10, at
400-18.
79. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
80. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
81. See id. at 148-49.
82. See Potaivatoni, 498 U.S. at 514.
83. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
84. See id. at 321. See also Oral Argument of Edward C. Dumont, Esq., On
Behalf of the United States, as Amicus Curiae, Supporting the Petitioner, Kiowa Tribe v.
Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (No. 96-1037), 1998 WL 15116, at *27
(Jan. 12, 1998) (discussing the connection to International Shoe).
85. Oral Argument of R. Brown Wallace, Esq., On Behalf of the Petitioner, Kiowa,
523 U.S. 751 (1998) (No. 96-1037), 1998 WL 15116, at *12 (Jan. 12, 1998).
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hypotheticals that yielded the same result: "Maybe they have oil
bubbling up underneath the basement, violating environmental laws.
Can you get an injunction? What about a fine? What about taxes, and
what about the rent? '86 All of these appear to have the same resolution
under Kiowa: the state will not be able to enforce any of its laws against
the tribe, even though the tribe is doing business within the state itself.
On the one hand, the state can still act against individual officers if
they are breaking the law by exercising jurisdiction over the individual.
However, enforcement of state law may be limited based on sovereign
immunity. For example, if a tribal officer is speeding in a tribal
corporation-owned truck, on corporate business, then that driver can be
stopped and ticketed. But if state law would normally authorize seizing
the truck, the police would be unable to do so2t
D. How Far Will It Go? Dixon, Ex parte Young, and
Waiver as Possible Limitations
Given the potential trouble areas described above," it is important at
this point to consider the farthest reaches of the Kiowa immunity, and
possible ways for states, businesses, and individuals to head off
problems." On the one hand, Kiowa would seem to suggest unlimited
sovereign immunity, not subject to much, if any, review by the courts.
However, courts and litigants have made inroads to curtail the doctrine
and prevent it from becoming too strong.
As noted, 90 there is the possibility of some future tribal corporation
buying up non-tribal corporations, then doing business off-reservation
and claiming immunity. Kiowa does not approach this potential
problem. As early as 1989, the Supreme Court of Arizona was wrestling
with Kiowa-like questions in Dixon v. Picopa Construction Co.9' It is
86. Id. at* "12-13.
87. For the origin of this hypothetical, see id. at *21. The Justice who raised this
scenario as a hypothetical during oral argument was apparently drawing a distinction
between individual property and tribal property. Seemingly, the individual property
could be seized, while the tribal property, belonging to a sovereign entity, cannot legally
be seized.
88. See supra Part II.C.
89. Note that this section only considers the basics of possible methods of
hemming in the Kiowa immunity; for further developed recommendations for courts,
businesses, states, and practitioners, see infra Part V.
90. See supra Part II.C.
91. 772P.2d 1104 (Ariz. 1989).
one of the few cases to find against a grant of immunity.9 The case was
not appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the court's analysis bears a
closer look, and may provide both courts and practitioners with
arguments that provide a means of scaling the nearly insuperable wall of
Kiowa.
Dixon attacks sovereign immunity by questioning whether the
corporation at hand is even enough of a part of the tribe to properly
assert sovereign immunity. This case was a tort action involving a truck
driven off the reservation and owned by a tribal construction
corporation, which itself operated off the reservation. The court held
that the corporation was not a "subordinate economic organization" of
the tribe, in spite of the fact that the tribe owned all of its stock. In
holding that the corporation was not an arm of the tribe, the court looked
to several factors: (1) "a board of directors, separate from the tribal
government, which exercises full managerial control over the
corporation;" (2) "the purchase of general liability insurance covering
Picopa's negligence and the limited liability clause found in Picopa's
charter insulate the Community's assets from Picopa's debts;"93 (3) "the
ordinance's express declaration that the Community formed Picopa
solely for business purposes;" (4) the corporation was formed "without
any declared objective of promoting the Community's general tribal or
economic development" and "was simply a for-profit corporation
involved in construction projects" that had not "limited itself to tribal
projects;" (5) the charter did "not require that either board members or
corporate officers be selected from among Community officers or even
members;" and (6) the corporation held "title to any acquired property in
its own name and not in the Community's." 4
Dixon has never been specifically overruled, although its distinctions
regarding governmental purposes versus general business purposes
would be void under Kiowa.95 However, it does help in answering
questions about how far the immunity will go, since it suggests a line of
attack against a corporation that has grown far afield of the tribe. Dixon
92. For further analyses of this case, see Lake, supra note 11, at 94-96, and
CANBY, supra note 10, at 94-95. For another case finding against sovereign immunity,
see Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d 845 (N.M. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1029
(1989) (holding that sovereign immunity did not apply to off-reservation activities and
recognition of another sovereign's immunity was solely a matter of comity; this idea was
not advanced by the Court in Kiowa, however).
93. The presence of insurance was deemed evidence that the entity was not a
subordinate economic unit, but insurance itself does not waive the immunity. See Dixon,
772 P.2d at 1109-10.
94. Id. at 1108-10.
95. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]ribes enjoy immunity from suits on
contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities."
Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,760 (1998).
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may be a useful shield if tribes begin creating large, off-reservation
corporations or buying a corporation and then claiming immunity for
that corporation.
Besides Dixon, two other approaches provide some hemming in of the
nearly infinite reach given immunity in Kiowa. Plaintiffs can attempt to
get around sovereign immunity, either by suing individual defendants or
by proving a waiver has taken place. Both avenues are rife with
problems. In suing individual defendants, a plaintiff must show those
individuals acted outside the scope of employment, not merely beyond
their authority. The plaintiff succeeded in Burnham, but only in getting
past the motion to dismiss stage.96 Under Ex parte Young,97 a state
officer may be sued in federal court for prospective injunctive relief to
stop that officer from violating rights guaranteed by a federal statute.
While the Ex parte Young doctrine may be helpful in framing suits
facing sovereign immunity,9s it does not provide for damages, only for
injunctive relief. In addition, the doctrine has been weakened somewhat
in cases like Seminole Tribe v. Florida" and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe. °°
Waiver is another method used to cut back at the outer limits of Kiowa
immunity. However, proving a waiver of sovereign immunity is nearly
impossible. All such waivers are strictly construed. Under the standard
articulated in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,'°' waivers will not be
implied, and must be unequivocally expressed.'O A waiver cannot be
96. See Burnham v. Pequot Pharm. Network, No. CV 95536264, 1998 WL 345463
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 1998). The future disposition of the case is unknown.
97. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Exparte Young doctrine, as it is known, established
the ability of litigants to enjoin state officers from continuing acts of illegality.
98. Instead of suing the tribe and facing certain defeat, litigants could sue tribal
officials and enjoin them from acting contrary to state and federal law. For example, if
the officials were imposing a tax in violation of federal law, the taxpayer could sue to
enjoin enforcement. See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1133-34
(9th Cir. 1995); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian
Reservation, 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992); CANBY,
supra note 10, at 90.
99. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply
where intricate remedial measures are already contemplated by Congress, as under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
100. 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding that Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply in
areas of special sovereignty interests, such as quiet title actions involving the state).
Ironically, both Seminole and Coeur d'Alene involved tribes blocked from suing states
by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
101. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
102. See id. at 58-59. In this case, the Court held that Congress had not waived
implied merely by entering into a contract or by submitting to
arbitration, or even via a gaming compact. In Calvello v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe,0 3 the tribe initially submitted to arbitration, had an oral contract
with an employee and a compact with the state, yet none of these actions
waived immunity." Even a "sue-or-be-sued" provision does not state a
waiver clearly enough, according to most courts.05 Furthermore, those
doing business with tribes must be certain they obtain a perfectly clear
waiver.0 6 Even more confusing, those doing business must be certain to
obtain the waiver from the proper tribal authority. In Chance v. Coquille
Indian Tribe,' the plaintiff obtained a waiver from the president of the
tribe's management corporation; however, the waiver had to be
approved by the corporation's board of directors and therefore was
invalid.' 8
The difficulties in bringing arguments under Dixon, Ex parte Young,
and waiver, as discussed above, highlight the breadth of immunity
granted in Kiowa. Obviously, ordinary business sense will necessitate
contracting properly for clear waivers but, as noted, some litigants will
simply not have that choice. The breadth of the immunity is particularly
apparent considering the relatively narrow immunity currently enjoyed
by other sovereigns. This issue is considered in the next section.
HI. THE CHANGING FACE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR FEDERAL,
STATE, FOREIGN, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS
A. Federal, State, and Foreign Governments: The Decline of
Sovereign Immunity
While a complete analysis of the changing face of sovereign immunity
in this nation is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is useful to
sovereign immunity with the Indian Civil Rights Act, contrary to the rulings of numerous
lower courts. At issue was a tribal ordinance which denied tribal membership to children
of female tribal members who married outside the tribe, while granting it to children of
male members who married outside the tribe. Thus, a female tribal member was not
allowed to sue on an Equal Protection claim. The Court held that only the writ of habeas
corpus was given a specific remedy in the statute, and so only in that area had Congress
waived tribal sovereign immunity. Courts have construed this as being an extremely
strict waiver requirement. See id.
103. 584 N.W.2d 108 (S.D. 1998).
104. See id. at 112-13.
105. See supra note 10.
106. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian
Reservation, 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991).
107. 963 P.2d 638 (Or. 1998). This case is also notable because it is one of the first
to cite Kiowa as binding.
108. See id. at 640-41.
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consider the expanding nature of tribal sovereign immunity in relation to
state and federal sovereign immunity. Most significantly, although
federal and state governments could enjoy sovereign immunity in
virtually every area, it is yielded in many important ways. Though they
certainly maintain it as something of a shield in some instances,'O° the
choice to give it up is evidence of a modem governmental trend that is
contrary to the maintenance of immunity for tribes. Though tribes could
choose to follow suit by waiving immunity, they do not appear to have
done so. This modem trend of yielding sovereign immunity by federal
and state governments is a result of practicality and reasonableness as
well as political forces. In addition, the United States has chosen to alter
its treatment of foreign sovereigns in some instances. As a result, tribal
governments enjoy more immunity in U.S. courts than federal, state and
foreign governments. According to Justice Stevens, "In my opinion all
Governments-federal, state, and tribal-should generally be
accountable for their illegal conduct."" Yet even as immunity is cut
back for federal, state and foreign governments, it is increasing for
tribes.
1. The Federal Government as a Sovereign Entity
As the sovereign, the federal government cannot be sued at all without
its express waiver. Yet in many instances the federal government has in
fact chosen to do just that. Most significantly,' Congress has limited
the sovereign immunity for tort liability via the Federal Tort Claims
Act"2 and for liability arising out of its commercial activities via the
Tucker Act." 3 The federal government also allows suits for violations of
the Bill of Rights. In direct contradiction to the immunity held for tribal
corporations, corporations created by the federal government have been
109. For example, states maintain immunity against suits by Indian tribes. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47, 76 (1996) (holding that state had sovereign
immunity from tribe in IGRA claim).
110. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 514-15 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring).
111. Justice Stevens considers such waivers significant as "a matter of national
policy." Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 765 (1998) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
112. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994) (creating a scheme for tort claims against the
federal government).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997) (creating a scheme for suing the
federal government on commercial claims).
held not to have the same sovereign immunity as the federal
government. Only Congress can grant these corporations immunity." 4
In addition, the federal government may allow qui tam actions, in which
citizens may bring suit on behalf of the government for violations of
law." 5
2. States as Sovereigns
Like the federal government, the states are essentially immune from
suit without express permission. While the federal immunity is rooted in
implicit recognition of the sovereign, state sovereign immunity is
required by the Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."...6
This has been interpreted as providing immunity against suits even
from a State's own citizens, although states can sue states and the United
States retains the non-delegable 7 power to sue States. Yet states have
waived their immunities in many instances, from tort claims to contract
actions and state constitution suits. Also, such immunity has been
impinged in different ways. For example, the Ex parte Young doctrine
permits suits against government officials to enjoin actions in violation
of law. Under the precedent set in Nevada v. Hall,"' a state retains its
sovereignty only within its borders, yielding it when the state or its
employees enter the domain of another sovereign.
In addition, even though a tribe automatically extends its immunity to
entities it forms, the same is not true for states. For example, a county
does not have standing to assert a state's Eleventh Amendment
114. See Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 389 (1939);
see also McLish, supra note 30, at 176 (noting that federal corporations do not hold the
immunity unless Congress specifically grants it to them); CrVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES, ITS AGENCIES, OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES 5 (Jon L. Craig ed., 2d ed.
1992) (noting that immunity does not automatically apply to federally created
corporations).
115. "Qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur" means "Who
sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1251 (6th
ed. 1990). Under this doctrine, an individual may be permitted by statute to sue on
behalf of himself as well as for the government, and is permitted to retain part of the
penalty recovered. See id.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
117. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47, 55-73, 76 (1996) (stating that
the United States cannot delegate its power to sue states to Indian tribes, effectively
invalidating a significant portion of the IGRA).
118. 440 U.S. 410, 416-27 (1978) (holding that immunity is not recognized for
Nevada state employee's car accident in California).
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sovereign immunity. In In re Merry-Go-Round Enterprises, Inc.," 9 the
County, as a mere subdivision of a state, could not use the state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity to preclude the bankruptcy court from
adjudicating the secured nature of a claim which it had filed in a debtor-
taxpayer's case.2 ' To claim such an immunity, the County would have
to show it was "the arm or alter ego of a State.''. Furthermore, in this
case, the County had waived any immunity it might have claimed by
filing proof of claim with the bankruptcy court." By way of contrast,
courts have held that tribal involvement in arbitration and litigation does
not waive its immunity.'"
3. Foreign Governments
At one time, foreign governments enjoyed absolute immunity against
suits in the courts of the United States. This right, like that of tribal
immunity, was developed by the Supreme Court.' Congress has since
limited such absolute immunity via the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act." While the Act still allows foreign sovereign immunity for
governmental acts, it makes a clear distinction for commercial activities
carried on in the United States, or such activities elsewhere that have a
"direct effect in the United States."'26 While a foreign sovereign might
of course refuse to appear in court, its commercial entity may not have a
choice, since it may have assets in the United States which can be
seized.
119. 227 B.R. 775 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998).
120. See id. at 777.
121. Id. at 778.
122. See id. at 779.
123. See, e.g., Calvello v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 584 N.W.2d 108, 112 (S.D. 1998)
(holding that casino participation in arbitration proceedings does not waive its tribal
sovereign immunity; nor did a contract or a gaming compact).
124. See Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). This
case's holding, permitting immunity from suit in United States courts for a foreign
sovereign's vessel of war, has extended virtually absolute immunity to sovereigns. See
id. at 145; see also McLish, supra note 30, at 176.
125. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605, 1607 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997) (creating a system for
suing sovereign entities under certain circumstances, in spite of any claimed sovereign
immunity).
126. Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 765 (1998) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).
B. Indian Tribal Sovereign Immunity: The Expansion of
Sovereign Immunity
1. History
The doctrine of Indian tribal sovereignty has varied widely throughout
U.S. history based on statutes, case law, and particular federal policies
existing at a given time. This section'27 considers only that history which
is necessary as a background to the issues leading up to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity'u for tribally-created commercial entities doing
business off the reservation,'29 particularly in light of the discussion of
history in Kiowa.'
Any discussion of sovereign immunity, particularly its history in the
courts, must start with the classic triumvirate of Supreme Court cases:
Johnson v. McIntosh,3' Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 32 and Worcester v.
Georgia.' To start at the beginning of the Supreme Court's analysis of
tribal sovereignty is to start with the narrow view expressed in Johnson.
Here, the Court set forth the idea that the federal government allows
tribal immunity as a matter of discretion. Tribes' sovereignty was
deemed "necessarily diminished" by the discovery of North America by
the Europeans.'
Cherokee Nation also provides a somewhat narrow view of Indian
sovereignty, even referring to the tribes as "domestic dependent
nations. ' 3 On the one hand, this had the effect of subjugating the tribes.
According to Justice Marshall, "they are in a state of pupilage; their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."'36
On the other hand, it brought out the idea that they were in fact
nations-of a sort. The tribe was "a distinct political society, separated
127. See also infra Part IV.A.2 for more on history in the context of Kiowa.
128. For concise histories focusing on tribal sovereign immunity, see CANBY, supra
note 10, at 68-95; McLish, supra note 30, at 178-80.
129. For more extensive treatments of the history of Indian tribes and their status as
sovereign nations, see CANBY, supra note 10, at 10-32. See generally COHEN, supra note
8.
130. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756-58.
131. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding land conveyance by tribal chiefs to
private individuals invalid since tribe only had right of occupancy, not title).
132. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (holding that tribe could not bring suit when Georgia
law invalidated Cherokee laws).
133. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding that Georgia was preempted by federal
law from applying its laws to two missionaries on Cherokee land).
134. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
135. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
136. Id.
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from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself."'37
This "domestic dependent nation" status provided a framework for the
Court to view tribes in terms of their sovereignty, yet allowed for great
limitations to that sovereignty.
Worcester provides for the broad view of sovereignty that has lasted
over 150 years. In saying that Georgia laws would not apply to the tribe,
the Court gave the first clear expression of the doctrine regarding
sovereign immunity. According to the case, before colonization tribes
had been full sovereigns, and even though they were subjugated to a
higher government now, the tribes were still "distinct, independent,
political communities, retaining their original natural rights."'
138
With sovereignty established by the Court, it could now develop the
boundaries of an immunity doctrine, which was viewed as "a necessary
corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance."'39  Turner v.
United States'4° has proven an ironic turning point for the sovereign
immunity doctrine for Indian tribes. There, the Court dismissed a
relatively simple suit by a non-Indian against a tribe. The Court
explained, "The fundamental obstacle to recovery is not the immunity of
a sovereign to suit, but the lack of a substantive right to recover the
damages resulting from failure of a government or its officers to keep
otherthe peace. In other words, the Court was saying that although
immunity might be viewed as an obstacle, the primary obstacle was
something else entirely: the tribal government should not be held liable
for the actions of its citizens. The Kiowa Court so characterized Turner:
"[Turner] is, at best, an assumption of immunity for the sake of
argument, not a reasoned statement of doctrine."'42
Turner's language regarding "immunity of a sovereign to suit" was
picked up by USF&G'43 and a series of cases and used to defend the
"fact" that tribes have immunity from suit. Kiowa has provided the final
linchpin for the doctrine. Starting with the narrow view of Johnson, it is
137. Id. at 15.
138. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
139. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476
U.S. 877, 890 (1986).
140. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
141. Id. at 358.
142. Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998). For
more on the "accident" of Turner, see infra Part IV.A.2.
143. 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (dismissing a cross-claim against a tribe based on
sovereign immunity; this immunity continued even after the dissolution of the tribal
government).
hard to imagine that the sovereignty doctrine covering these "domestic
dependent nations" would have spread so far as to encompass tribally-
created entities leaving the reservation to perform purely commercial
functions. But that is exactly what has happened.
2. Some Limitations
Although the long history of Indian tribal sovereign immunity appears
like an insuperable wall, the question remains: what sort of sovereigns
are these? After all, despite their court-respected sovereign status,
Congress can take away sovereign immunity at any time."4 Such
Congressional power makes tribes seem more like departments of the
federal government than actual sovereign entities. In fact, Congress can
choose to take away a tribe's status as a tribe entirely, 45 and has done so
in the past.146  For example, several tribes have been terminated by
statute, such as the Klamaths of Oregon and the Menominees of
Wisconsin. 47 This was during a time when the federal government was
seeking to integrate Indians into general society. In fact, in 1953,
Congress stated "termination" as its official policy, in order to "make the
Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the
same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are
applicable to other citizens of the United States, [and] to end their status
as wards of the United States.""' As a result, over a hundred tribes,
particularly smaller ones, lost their tribal status. 49
Tribes, therefore, are a different kind of creature than states. Although
the federal government has the power to sue states, Congress cannot
simply delegate that power to others, as Seminole Tribe v. Florida made
clear. There, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not delegate
its power to sue to Indian tribes under the IGRA"5 However, Congress
has broader, perhaps infinite, powers over tribes, since it acts as a trustee
and superior sovereign over them.'
144. Congress, for instance, could pass a statute eliminating sovereign immunity for
any tribally-created corporations. It can also include a waiver of sovereign immunity
within certain statutes, applicable only to the statute at hand.
145. See CANBY, supra note 10, at 55-58.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 328-30 (1978) (holding
that since Congress could have but had not dissolved the tribe, it retained its sovereignty;
therefore, double jeopardy was not found where the sovereign tribe had already punished
defendant for crimes at issue in separate federal prosecution).
147. See CANBY, supra note 10, at 25-26, 55-58.
148. Id. at25 (quoting H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953)).
149. See id. at 55-58.
150. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,47,55-73,76 (1996).
151. The "special relationship" between the United States and the Indian tribes has
been characterized both by commentators and the federal government as that of trustee
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When considering the limited nature of the tribe as sovereign, the
question also arises as to what exactly constitutes a tribe. After all,
many tribes did not even exist as tribes, much less sovereign entities,
before the federal government began putting them together, moving
them around, and placing them on reservations. Following the War of
1812, in which many Indians sided with the British, and in light of
various land disputes, the federal government mandated a policy of
moving tribes to lands in the West in exchange for their territory in the
East.'52 Most affected were the "Five Civilized Tribes": the Cherokees,
Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles. President Andrew
Jackson in particular endorsed removal; Congress concurred with the
Indian Removal Act of 1830.153 Various tribes moved West to new
homes, while some settled elsewhere. For example, some Choctaws
remained in Mississippi and are still recognized as a tribe. Other
currently recognized tribes existed as parts of other tribes that the federal
government then split off, sometimes haphazardly. For example,
Congress dealt with various bands of Minnesota Indians as a single tribe,
finally unifying them by statute in 1889.'-
Congress and the Executive have often departed from ethnological
principles in order to determine tribes with which the United States would carry
on political relations. Congress has created "consolidated" or "confederated"
tribes consisting of several ethnological tribes, sometimes speaking different
languages.... Where no formal Indian political organization existed, scattered
communities were sometimes united into tribes and chiefs were appointed by
United States agents for the purpose of negotiating treaties. Once recognized in
this manner, the tribal existence of these groups has continued.
On the other hand, Congress has sometimes divided a jigle tribe, from the
ethnological standpoint, into a number of tribes or "bands."
Very few tribes exist now as the same entities as before the federal
government began its shuffling and reshuffling. Thus, to view Indians
as sovereigns because of their time-immemorial existence is to
contradict what clearly has been the law governing them for this nation's
history.'56 The upshot of these limitations is that tribes are sovereign
and beneficiary, with the federal government holding tribal land in trust. This
relationship has given the government broad powers over the Indians, as well as special
responsibilities. However, the precise nature of such a relationship has been difficult to
define. See CANBY, supra note 10, at 33-58.
152. See id. for the derivation of this account of Indian history.
153. Ch. 148,4 Stat. 411 (1846). See COHEN, supra note 8, at 81.
154. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 4-5.
155. Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
156. For more on the complicated and tragic history of the United States' early
only inasmuch as another sovereign, i.e., the federal government acting
through Congress, allows them to be so. However, it is questionable
whether Congress, or the Supreme Court, should have been recognizing
various disassociated groups as sovereigns.
Some tribes, such as those in Alaska, are rather unique in their
structure as corporations, built of stock that is fully alienable. Under the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, '5 regional and village
corporations were established. Enrolled natives would receive corporate
stock, and the corporations were delegated control over land and natural
resources.5 It is difficult to envision a corporate entity, owned by
individuals yet recognized as a tribe, as being "sovereign." Such notions
challenge the very framework of what constitutes a tribe and why such
an entity might be deemed sovereign. They also highlight the rather
nebulous nature of their immunity.
Against this background it is possible to examine the laws and cases
that have diminished tribal sovereign immunity. Considering these both
calls into question the firmness of immunity as expounded by the
Supreme Court and helps highlight the nature of that immunity.
Sovereignty itself has been limited in many ways. Tribes don't have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 59 In fact, Indian tribes may not
even have jurisdiction over their own members under certain
circumstances. For example, the Major Crimes Act'6 states that murder
and other serious crimes are under federal jurisdiction when committed
by an Indian in Indian country. The law was passed in an era when
tribal courts were nearly non-existent,6 ' but the law's vitality continues
to this day. In addition, tribes have only limited jurisdiction over non-
Indians in civil suits,' and there are some limitations on hunting and
fishing regulations.6 3 Even if an Indian tribe has sovereignty over its
own land, that sovereignty does not protect it from state taxes after the
relations with Indians and Indian tribes, see generally id. at 47-127; CANBY, supra note
10, at 10-20.
157. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
158. For more on the complex structure of these corporate/tribal entities, see
COHEN, supra note 8, at 739-70; CANBY, supra note 10, at 367-99.
159. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). See CANBY, supra note 10, at 19.
161. The act was passed in response to Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
In this case, the Court held that a murder of an Indian by another Indian in Indian
country was within the sole jurisdiction of the tribe. See id. at 572. That decision would
have given federal courts no power to hear the case had the Major Crimes Act not later
been passed.
162. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
852-53, 856 (1985) (holding that the District Court may determine whether the tribal
court had exceeded its jurisdictional powers, though only after there had been exhaustion
of tribal court remedies).
163. See Montanav. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 560-65 (1981).
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tribe has sold freely alienable tribal property to a third party and then
repurchased it.' 4
Public Law 280,165 enacted in 1953, severely limits tribal jurisdiction,
even over internal matters, within a tribe's own reservation borders. It
provides that certain states, five initially and those choosing to adopt
it,"6 shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian territory. This
seriously impinges on a tribal government's right to govern itself and act
as a sovereign.
In addition, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) 67 brings the Bill of
Rights to bear on tribal governments.68 Such an act may appear to foster
sovereign immunity by recognizing tribes as governments and by
placing them on somewhat of an equal level with the federal and state
governments with respect to tribes' duties to their citizens. However,
such an act effectively stamps out the right of tribes to determine their
own laws in the areas covered by the ICRA, since Congress has
effectively exercised its dominion and control over it. In other words, it
is Congress and not the tribes doing the governing.'69
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),"7' on its face, appears to
grant tribes greater power over their own affairs by compelling states to
use good faith in bargaining for gaming compacts with the tribes. 7'
However, this merely reiterates what has been implicit all along: tribes
are entirely dependent on Congress for their sovereign status. Congress
can even subjugate tribes to states by allowing tribes to govern
164. See Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S.
103, 115 (1998) (holding that when Congress makes Indian reservation land freely
alienable, it manifests an unmistakably clear intent to render the land subject to state and
local taxation, and the repurchase of the land by an Indian tribe does not cause the land
to reassume tax-exempt status).
165. 67 Stat. 588 (1953), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1322 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994). See generally CANBY, supra note 10, at
27, 216-42.
166. Initially, California, Nebraska, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin were given
jurisdiction under the statute. See CANBY, supra note 10, at 27.
167. 82 Stat. 77 (1968), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
168. Prior to this act, the Bill of Rights only applied directly to the federal
government and, via the Fourteenth Amendment, to the states. See CANBY, supra note
10, at29.
169. See id.
170. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). See generally CANBY,
supra note 10, at 282-312.
171. After Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that tribes cannot
sue states), the tribes may not have much legal ability to compel states to bargain in good
faith; they must rely on the federal government for this.
themselves only when they bargain with states. In fact, if a state, such as
Utah, does not allow gambling within its borders, then the tribes within
that state have no right to allow gambling. Tribes are completely
preempted by state law on this issue. Finally, the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Acte72 limits tribes by requiring
liability insurance' and the IGRA restricts immunity with respect to
gaming activities."
In general, Indians and Indian entities are governed by state law when
they are in the state but off the reservation. For example, a state would
have the authority to tax or regulate tribal activities occurring within the
state but outside Indian country.'
In addition to the cases mentioned above, other cases limiting Indian
sovereignty include Montana v. United States, 76 in which the Court held
that even though the tribe owned a stream, the state had the sovereign
right to the riverbed, since such ownership was inherent in state
sovereignty; 77 Rice v. Rehner,'7 in which the Court held that a state can
require an Indian trader to obtain a state liquor license;1 79 and Seminole
Tribe v. Florida." Seminole further highlights the fact that tribal
sovereignty is by no means unlimited. Although states can sue states,
tribes cannot sue states without a waiver. Although the United States
can sue states, it cannot simply delegate that power to tribes, in this case,
to sue over a state's failure to bargain in good faith under the IGRA.
This puts the tribes in an awkward position: in terms of sovereignty, they
clearly are on a different par than states. This fact, coupled with the
laws discussed above, calls into question the continuing vitality of their
status as sovereigns and their legal right to govern many of their own
affairs and to defend their rights in court. The question remains: even if
the Supreme Court treats them as sovereigns in cases like Kiowa, are
they really?
3. Expansions and Reaffirmations
Kiowa merely highlights the fact that sovereignty for tribes has been
172. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458 (1994 & Supp. m 1997).
173. See id. § 450f(c)(3) (regarding mandatory liability insurance).
174. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (1994).
175. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973); Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962); see also Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing
Tech., Inc 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998).
176. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
177. See id. at 551-57.
178. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
179. See id. at 720-22.
180. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that states retain sovereign immunity against
tribes, despite the tribes' sovereign status).
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expanded and reaffirmed in several ways. Notwithstanding any
diminishment of tribal sovereignty, and notwithstanding any challenges
to the notions of what constitutes a tribe, the fact remains that tribes are
effectively treated in the law as sovereigns. Though different than
states, tribes retain many characteristics of independent, self-determining
entities, and in some instances, those powers have been growing.
As self-governing entities, tribes have almost unlimited powers over
internal affairs. For example, cases like Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe,"8 ' National Farmers v. Crow Tribe of Indians,' 2 and Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez'83 establish and reaffirm their powers over their own
internal affairs.'"4 Meanwhile, cases like USF&G'" have supported
sovereign immunity. Several cases have both reaffirmed and increased
sovereignty, particularly sovereign immunity. Among cases that have
reaffirmed sovereignty are United States v. Wheeler'86 and Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation.'
Although Congress can waive a tribe's immunity, it did not do so in
the Civil Rights Act of 1968, despite the imposition of some of the
restrictions of the Bill of Rights upon the tribes.' 3 In addition, it is very
significant for the tribes that states do not have the authority to infringe
tribal self-governance, and states are effectively preempted from the
field of Indian law by the federal government.! In fact, as a result of
the expansion of tribal immunity and the contraction of state, federal and
foreign sovereign immunity, tribes currently enjoy more immunity from
181. 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (holding that the tribe has inherent power to tax).
182. 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) (holding that tribal exhaustion of remedies required).
183. 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978) (holding that suits against the tribe under the ICRA are
barred by sovereign immunity).
184. But see Reynolds, supra note 27 (discussing internal areas over which tribes
are not sovereign); Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524
U.S. 103, 115 (1998) (holding that tribes do not retain rights against taxation over lands
sold to non-Indians and then repurchased).
185. 309 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1940) (holding that tribes are immune from cross-
claims).
186. 435 U.S. 313, 323-28 (1978) (holding that tribes have those rights not
specifically withdrawn by treaty or statute, and have inherent rights to punish tribal
offenders, and do so as independent sovereigns, not as arms of the federal government).
187. 447 U.S. 134, 151-54 (1980) (holding that although the state can impose some
nondiscriminatory taxes on non-Indian customers of Indian retailers doing business on
the reservation, tribes have inherent power to tax on their own lands).
188. See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 58-59 (holding that ICRA did not waive
sovereign immunity, except in habeas corpus actions); see also CANBY, supra note 10, at
91.
189. See Danahy, supra note 10, at 685 & n.56.
suit than many other government entities. 90 According to Justice
Stevens, "[T]he rule is strikingly anomalous. Why should an Indian
tribe enjoy broader immunity than the States, the Federal Government,
and foreign nations?"'9' The reasons for this "anomaly" are discussed in
the next section.
IV. FLAWS IN THE ARGUMENTS: WHY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY SHOULD
NOT EXTEND THIS FAR
The Supreme Court in Kiowa, and in other cases,' 92 advanced a series
of arguments in favor of sovereign immunity for tribal corporations that
conduct business off the reservation. This section addresses these
arguments, and provides possible counterarguments, some of them
supplied by the Court in Kiowa. This section also advances direct
arguments against the Kiowa immunity.
A. Arguments Given in Support of the Doctrine
1. Congress Hasn't Spoken
"[W]e defer to the role Congress may wish to exercise in this
important judgment."'93  The majority's argument in Kiowa that the
Supreme Court must defer to Congress is perhaps the strongest one in
favor of retaining, and recognizing the expansion of, tribal sovereign
immunity. After all, stare decisis is a powerful force, and it is difficult
to reverse years of cases and potentially throw tribes into disarray at this
late date. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has been particularly
unwilling to reverse a line of cases in which Congress appears to
acquiesce when Congress could easily change the rule of law.
According to Kiowa, "[t]he capacity of the Legislative Branch to address
the issue by comprehensive legislation counsels some caution.., in this
area."' 94 The Supreme Court may be less willing to reverse here than on
constitutional interpretations. If Congress disagreed with the Court's
decision on a constitutional issue, Congress would face the nearly
190. Of course, one main difference between tribes and state and federal
governments is that another entity besides the tribes themselves, i.e., Congress, can alter
that immunity. This makes them more akin to foreign sovereigns than states in this
regard.
191. Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 765 (1998) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
192. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
498 U.S. 505 (1991).
193. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
194. Id. at 759.
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impossible task of passing an amendment. In the area of sovereign
immunity, Congress need only pass a statute to overrule the Court's
holding. Thus, the Court's argument that "Congress hasn't spoken" is a
strong one and is, in fact, the only one that the Kiowa majority itself
does not tear down.
The Court in an earlier case, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,95 rested its decision on similar grounds.
The Court stated, "Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with
such tribal immunity or to limit it. Although Congress has occasionally
authorized limited classes of suits against Indian tribes, it has never
authorized suits to enforce tax assessments. Instead, Congress has
consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine."'96
This argument in favor of sovereign immunity relies mainly on the
premise that if Congress cared, it would speak; by negative implication,
Congress is expressing approval by saying nothing. Congress can, and
has, spoken on the issue when it wishes to do so. For example, the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act'9 specifically states that it
applies to Indian tribes, and this has been interpreted to mean that
immunity does not apply.'98 As Kiowa states, "Congress has acted
against the background of our decisions"' 99 by enacting legislation that
included presumptions that have arisen in Supreme Court cases, like
Indian sovereignty. In addition, Congress did speak in the area of
foreign sovereigns when it chose to limit that immunity. 200
The idea that Congress can regulate through silence is rather dubious,
and has been the subject of criticism."° The "Congress hasn't spoken"
195. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
196. Id. at 510.
197. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5125-5126 (1994), amended by Hazardous Materials
Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-615, 104 Stat. 3244, 3245
(1990).
198. See id.; see also CANBY, supra note 10, at 91; Northern States Power Co. v.
Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the Act preempted a tribal nuclear radiation control ordinance, and that
Congress has the power to waive tribal sovereign immunity).
199. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
200. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp. 11I 1997). The Act does not
apply to tribes. Congress knows how to limit immunity, and could easily have created
such a limitation for tribes had it wanted to.
201. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Forward:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16-17 & 16 n.92 (1975); see also
McLish, supra note 30, at 183-84 & 184 n.92.
argument can be attacked on two grounds. First, it is not necessary that
Congress act to prevent the Court from expanding rules of law. Second,
Congress may already have spoken in some ways that might prohibit the
extension expounded in Kiowa.
In oral argument during Kiowa, Supreme Court questions suggested
that perhaps Congress does not need to speak in order for a tribal
corporation to be subject to state jurisdiction when off the reservation.
As one Justice suggested at oral argument: "absent Federal law to the
contrary, [the fact that] these activities are subject to State authority
suggests that... Congress would have to affirmatively prohibit the
jurisdiction, rather than affirmatively authorize it."
On the one hand, Congress has stated its intent to promote Indian self-
sufficiency in its acts.' On the other, Congress itself has never passed a
statute in which Congress has expressly said tribes have immunity.' By
negative implication, this suggests Congress elected not to provide such
a grant. Of course, Congress in its legislation has acted against the
background of Supreme Court decisions, as Kiowa notes."5 Indeed,
Congress has passed an act directly recognizing tribal sovereign
immunity: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as (1) affecting,
modifying, diminishing, or otherwise impairing the sovereign immunity
from suit enjoyed by an Indian tribe." '
The key to the "Congress hasn't spoken" issue comes down to
whether the Supreme Court is declining to change an already existing
rule, or if it is actually expanding it. For example,' ° the Supreme Court
probably could not have adopted as part of United States domestic law
the commercial acts exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
before that act passed.03 Thus, the Supreme Court might not now be
202. Oral Argument of R. Brown Wallace, Esq., On Behalf of the Petitioner, Kiowa,
523 U.S. 751 (1998) (No. 96-1037), 1998 WL 15116, at *10 (Jan. 12, 1998).
203. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450-458 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997) ("true self-determination in any society of people is
dependent upon an educational process which will insure the development of qualified
people to fulfill meaningful leadership roles"), and the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1994) (declaring as policy that Indians should enjoy "a standard of
living from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in
neighboring communities").
204. See Oral Argument of Edward C. Dumont, Esq., On Behalf of the United
States, as Amicus Curiae, Supporting the Petitioner, Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (No.
96-1037), 1998 WL 15116, at *16 (Jan. 12, 1998).
205. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
206. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450(n).
207. This example is suggested in questioning during the oral arguments of Kiowa.
See Oral Argument of Edward C. Dumont, Esq., On Behalf of the United States, as
Amicus Curiae, Supporting the Petitioner, Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (No. 96-1037),
1998 WL 15116, at *16-18 (Jan. 12,1998).
208. The exception provides that foreign sovereigns waive their immunity for
774
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able to carve an "exception" for sovereign immunity for tribal
commercial enterprises, and must defer to Congress.
The argument that the Supreme Court is merely upholding an existing
rule fails on two counts. First, this assumes that the default rule provides
for pure sovereign immunity for Indian tribes, which itself was a
judicially created doctrine. Prior Supreme Court cases stated that the
default for sovereigns (specifically, states) acting in the domain of
another sovereign was no immunity." Second, it fails to recognize that
it provides an extension of sovereign immunity, rather than mere
recognition of an already existing immunity. Congress has never
provided for immunity under Kiowa circumstances, and instead has
spoken only about tribes themselves. Courts have been denying
immunity under such Kiowa-like circumstances," ' so rather than
restating existing common law, the Supreme Court in fact contravenes it.
A second line of attack on the "Congress hasn't spoken" argument is
the notion that Congress may already have spoken, albeit implicitly."1 '
First of all, Congress may have in fact spoken by not saying anything,
i.e., by not granting immunity in this area, it intended there be none.
Acts themselves may speak to Congressional intent. Under the Indian
Reorganization Act,212 Congress constructed a system whereby tribes can
organize themselves in two distinct ways. Under section 16,213 the tribe
organizes itself as a governmental entity. To account for commercial
activities, the tribe can use section 17214 to organize its corporate entities.
This allows the section 16 governmental entity to retain its sovereign
immunity, while permitting the section 17 corporate entity to conduct
commercial transactions, with a number of exceptions. See Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 1607 (1994 & Supp. Ill 1997). The
fact that Congress itself had to create such an exception helps back up the Court's
position that it must wait for Congress to act now.
209. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416-27 (1978) (holding that the state
was not immune from suit for its employee's involvement in a tort in another state).
210. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (state tax
applied to ski resort, an off-reservation commercial enterprise); Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962) (state fishing law applied to Indians even on
reservation); Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104 (Ariz. 1989) (no immunity for
off-reservation commercial activity); Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d 845 (N.M.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1029 (1989) (tribe loses immunity for off-reservation
commercial activity).
211. For more on this argument, see McLish, supra note 30, at 189-90.
212. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994).
213. Id. § 476.
214. Id. § 477.
business in a normal fashion. Congress, therefore, may have intended
tribal corporations, particularly those conducting non-tribal business, not
to retain the sovereign immunity of the tribes, in much the same fashion
that federal government corporate entities do not have such
sovereignty." 5
The real issue, of course, arises when section 16 tribes choose to
create corporate entities that retain sovereign immunity. This power
would seem to negate the very purpose of section 17; after all, it is
questionable why a tribe would create a corporation that can be sued,
when the tribe can create one that cannot be. Of course, it will be easier
for a corporation that can be sued to do business. However, the tribe can
choose to waive such immunity for some business deals and retain it for
others, which it cannot do for section 17 corporations. This seems to
contravene the intent of Congress in setting forth a corporation-creating
provision in the first place.
The "Congress hasn't spoken" argument is even more dubious
because even if Congress has not spoken directly, the Supreme Court
may not be authorized to speak where Congress has not. It's hard to say
that gap-filling is what is going on in Kiowa. Congress doesn't speak
for numerous reasons. This issue may simply not be at the top of its
priority list. It may merely be a matter of inertia. In addition, tribes
have lobbies that may discourage Congress from acting. One
commentator has even suggested another reason Congress may not have
acted: "Congress may have assumed that market pressures would
encourage the tribes to establish such [non-immune] corporations." 7
The final argument against the "Congress hasn't spoken" argument is
that the Supreme Court is effectively legislating in place of Congress,
which it should not be doing. This is taken up later.2"
2. History: A 'Slender Reed'219 of an Argument
Once a decision has been rendered, it becomes very difficult to
overturn it, especially when Congress itself could alter the result through
legislation. Therefore, when the Court in Kiowa refers to the pull of
215. See supra Part lI.A.1.
216. See generally Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian
Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHo L. REv. 465 (1998).
217. Lake, supra note 11, at 101.
218. See infra Part IV.B.5.
219. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Kiowa, refers to the key sovereign
immunity case, Turner, as "but a slender reed for supporting the principle of tribal
sovereign immunity." Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757
(1998).
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history,z' it really may mean the pull of stare decisis. On the one hand,
tribal sovereignty, and with that, sovereign immunity, is "settled law."' '
Even Justice Stevens, who is opposed to the doctrine, has admitted,
"[t]he rule that an Indian tribe is immune from an action for damages
absent its consent is... an established part of our law." The sovereign
immunity doctrine traces its way from its roots in early nineteenth
century decisions.. to such key decisions as Turner v. United States T4
and USF&G.22
The Court's decision in Kiowa is quick to point out that sovereign
immunity developed almost by accident. However, the long history of
an accidental doctrine cannot seriously be put forth as a justification.
Cases following Turner have used that case, and little else, to back up
sovereign immunity for tribes. According to Kiowa, "[tlhe doctrine is
said by some of our own opinions to rest on the Court's opinion in
Turner v. United States.'226 However, "examination shows [Turner]
simply does not stand for that proposition."'22 In Turner, the tribe gave
members parcels of land, and one hundred of them leased to Turner, who
built a fence around the parcels. A mob of Creek Indians tore down the
fence, and Congress passed a law allowing Turner to sue the Creek
Nation in the Court of Claims. Apparently, Congress had to permit
Turner to sue not because the tribe had immunity, but because "[t]he
tribal government had been dissolved." 9 The "accident" of Turner
occurred because the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the suit,
explaining, "[tlhe fundamental obstacle to recovery is not the immunity
of a sovereign to suit, but the lack of a substantive right to recover the
damages resulting from failure of a government or its officers to keep
the peace."' 30 In other words, a sovereign cannot be held liable for the
actions of its members and for its own failure to adequately police them.
220. See id. at 756-58.
221. Id. at 756.
222. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 514 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring).
223. See supra Part II.B.1.
224. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
225. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
226. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756.
227. Id.
228. The Court of Claims was established to permit litigation of certain types of
suits by and against Indian tribes. It is still in existence. See CANBY, supra note 10, at
354-57.
229. Turner, 248 U.S. at 358.
230. Id.
"No such liability existed by the general law."' 3' According to Kiowa,
the quoted language is the heart of Turner, and "[i]t is, at best, an
assumption of immunity for the sake of argument, not a reasoned
statement of doctrine. '' 2
Many cases, including those of the Supreme Court, picked up on the
"sovereign immunity" language and it became an explicit holding. 33
Yet none of these cases performed careful analysis of the doctrine or
where it had come from; they merely cited Turner and its successor,
USF&G, as authority.' These cases had, "with little analysis," merely
"reiterated the doctrine." '  USF&G itself really relied on Turner 6 for
its assertion that "[t]hese Indian Nations are exempt from suit without
Congressional authorization." 7 In fact, Justice Stevens felt that even
USF&G was not reliable for expounding the sovereign immunity
proposition: "At most, the holding extends only to federal cases in which
the United States is litigating on behalf of a tribe." 8 This means that an
entire line of cases is fatally flawed and cannot be relied upon to assert
or expand a doctrine like sovereign immunity.
3. Sovereignty and Self-Determination
A sovereign entity can choose whether or not it wants to be sued. This
is the basic presumption underlying the notion of tribal sovereign
immunity. In order to govern itself and determine its path, it must be
able to wield such sovereignty in whatever way it chooses, or it is no
longer sovereign. With so many laws already impinging on the Indian
right to self-governance, it may seem natural that a rule allowing
unlimited sovereign immunity is only fair. Congress has passed many
acts recognizing and endorsing tribal sovereignty. 9
Arguably, however, the actions of a for-profit corporation doing non-
tribal business off the reservation have little, if anything, to do with self-
231. Id.at357.
232. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757.
233. See USF&G, 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).
234. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 167, 172-73
(1977); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Three Affiliated Tribes
of Forth Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890-91 (1986); Blatchford
v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. 261,267-70 (1997); see also Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756.
235. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757.
236. See USF&G, 309 U.S. at 512 (citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354,
358 (1919)).
237. Id.
238. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450-458 (1994 & Supp. m 1997); Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-
1543 (1994).
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determination. After all, such a corporation is acting independently of
the tribe and its goals. Such immunity has more to do with bad business.
The only manner in which Kiowa immunity connects with sovereignty,
of course, is in the tribe's right to act as a sovereign in creating whatever
entity it wants and in choosing not to let such an entity be sued
anywhere for anything. First, this assumes the absolute sovereignty of
tribes, which is not an easy assumption.2 ° But more importantly, it
presumes that such immunity advances the cause of tribes, and that such
immunity should exist in areas governed by other sovereigns 4' neither
of which may be legitimate arguments.
It is worthwhile to note that the Supreme Court has already established
a rule for determining state civil jurisdiction over Indians in Indian
country. In the seminal case Williams v. Lee,24" the Court established the
oft-quoted analysis that such cases -involve the query whether "the state
action infringed on the right of [the] reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them."243 While that case dealt with a denial
of state court jurisdiction to hear a claim by a non-Indian against an
Indian for the purchase price of goods sold on the reservation, the
principle appears to have merit here. If the government wants to
promote tribal self-governance, it still need not grant tribal for-profit
corporations complete immunity off the reservation. State action (i.e., a
lawsuit) in such cases would not infringe on the right of tribes to "make
their own laws and be ruled by them," because tribal laws are
unenforceable off the reservation.
4. Economic Reasons
To say the least, the federal government's economic policy toward
Indians has been a disaster. Many tribes exist in a state of abject
poverty;2 gaming is perhaps the only economic chance many tribes
240. See discussion supra Parts III.B.1-2.
241. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416-27 (1979) (holding that the state cannot
claim immunity for actions of its employee in another state); see also Kiowa, 523 U.S. at
760-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The sovereign's claim to immunity in the courts of a
second sovereign... normally depends on the second sovereign's law.").
242. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
243. Id. at 220.
244. For example, unemployment on Indian reservations "is on average the highest
for any discrete group in the United States, ranging from seventeen percent on the
Jicarilla Apache Reservation in New Mexico to ninety percent on the Rosebud
Reservation in South Dakota." Seth H. Row, Comment, Tribal Sovereignty and
have to survive.245 The federal government has wavered in its policy
toward the existence of Indians tribes, from opting to wipe out the tribal
governments during the 1950s to the more recent attempt to support the
tribes in their efforts to become self sufficient. 6 Congress's current
goal is the promotion of economic development.247  For example, the
Indian Financing Act Amendment of 1984 states as its goal that the
government
provide capital on a reimbursable basis to help develop and utilize Indian
resources, both physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully
exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their own
resources and where they will enjoy a standard of living from their own
productive effqrts comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring
communities.
Such language, coupled with the notion that there is a trust agreement
between the federal government and the tribes,249 certainly gives
credence to the argument that Congress and the courts should do all they
can to protect impoverished tribes, even when this means vindicating the
interests of the tribe in its immunity against innocent victims. Of course,
a primary problem with the economic argument is that it pits victims
against one another. Granted, the large corporation and the tribe will
work out a deal whereby the tribe will waive immunity beforehand.
However, the sovereign immunity doctrine also strikes at tort victims,
employees of tribal corporations, businesses that are unaware of the
immunity yet sign contracts with tribal corporations, and bankrupt
businesses. A perplexing dilemma might arise when tribes, working in
fields like casino gambling, actually do business with one another: who
needs economic help in such a situation? In these instances, immunity
from suit will help tribes (potentially rich ones, at that) at the economic
expense of those who could have recovered had the other party not been
a tribal corporation.
Economic Development on the Reservation, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 227 (1996)
(citing Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Indian Service Population
and Labor Force Estimates (1989)).
245. According to one scholar, "those tribes with substantial gaming operations are
understandably inclined to view gaming as the first tribal economic program that has
really worked." CANBY, supra note 10, at 282.
246. For a history of the changing policy of the federal government toward Indian
tribes, see generally id. at 10-32.
247. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523
U.S. 751 (1998) (No. 96-1037), 1997 WL 668161, at *14 (Oct. 28, 1997); see also
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). See generally
COHEN, supra note 8, at 200-02.
248. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1994).
249. According to the trust arrangement, the federal government serves as trustee
and the Indians as beneficiaries, with the government holding tribal lands in trust. See
supra note 62; see also CANBY, supra note 10, at 33-58.
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Under this economic heading is also the argument that tribes deserve
sovereign immunity out of deference following a long period of human
rights violations. Notably, the Supreme Court has upheld preferences
for members of Indian tribes both on the reservations and in immediately
adjacent areas.2" But granting special rights to Indians alone is puzzling.
This argument might work as well for giving such rights to corporations
owned by other disenfranchised groups. In other words, it might provide
an argument for federal affirmative action for other groups as well. And
what if the tribes themselves discriminate against other disenfranchised
groups?
The economic argument probably has more backing than the human
rights one, especially given the power over finances it provides for
tribes: they alone (assuming Congress does not step in) have the power
to determine when to waive their immunity and when to subject
themselves to suit. But such economic arguments suggest tribes are at
risk of multimillion dollar lawsuits that would bankrupt them. However,
this is not the case. It is possible to set up tribal corporations to assume
all liability, to carry liability insurance, and yet still retain immunity for
the tribe itself.
These economic arguments also suggest that Kiowa sovereign
immunity should end when the tribes become self-empowered and able
to support themselves. It is, of course, difficult to tell when that has
occurred, especially given the disparity in resources among all the tribes.
Some are located in areas where gambling will pay off, with some left in
too remote an area to take advantage of the current law. However, there
is significant evidence that this is already an economic boom time for
many tribes. As Kiowa notes, "[t]ribal enterprises now include ski
resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians.'0 1  Casinos
have made many tribes rich; one extreme example is the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe of Connecticut. The tribe, composed of 275 members,
employs 6900 workers and as of 1994 had an estimated payroll of $226
million. The tribe recently donated ten million dollars to the
Smithsonian Institute.2 Tribes are not limited to these multimillion
dollar enterprises, either. Tribes own thousands of businesses off-
250. Such "Indian preference" has been upheld as valid. See, e.g., Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53 (1974) (relying on the fact that the preference is for a
recognized political designation, not a racial group); CANBY, supra note 10, at 313-15.
251. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at758.
252. See Danahy, supra note 10, at 696.
reservation, including a federally chartered bank in Montana2 3
In addition, Kiowa immunity may not even help tribes economically.
While it may save them money that might be given to tort victims, it
may cost them business in the long run.' Businesses, of course, will be
unwilling to work with an immune entity; the risk is simply too high.
Getting tribes to waive immunity simply adds to transaction costs.
Employees may be unwilling to work for an employer that will not own
up to its wrongs. Finally, those who do business at the reservations,
such as gamblers and skiers, may fear an inability to recover, both from
accidents at the place of business and in other parts of the reservation as
they travel to the place of business.
5. Comparison to Sovereign Immunity of the States
The tribes cannot sue the states,"5 and at first cut it seems grossly
unfair to recommend ending immunity for one sovereign and not for
another. In other words, a change in the law might leave states able to
sue tribes, but tribes unable to sue states. Furthermore, tribes were not
present at the Constitutional Convention to yield their immunity, as the
states were. In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak26 the Supreme
Court distinguished state and tribal immunity on this basis. The Court
there held that states retained their sovereign immunity against tribes
because tribes were not at the Convention, and thus were not parties to
the "mutuality of... concession" that "makes the States' surrender of
immunity from suit by sister States plausible."' 7 By way of extension, it
can be argued that tribes did not give up their immunity to states or
individuals.
However, the fact remains that tribal immunity has less basis in the
law than does state immunity. Tribal immunity still rests on a
misinterpretation of Turner 8 that was picked up by future cases and, to
some extent, by Congress. Many tribes did not even exist at the time of
the Convention and would therefore have no sovereignty to retain, and
would have only that immunity which Congress specifically granted
253. See id.
254. For further discussion of the economic pitfalls of immunity, see McLish, supra
note 30, at 188-89.
255. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47, 55-73, 76 (1996) (holding that
states retain sovereign immunity against tribes, and the federal government cannot
delegate its right to sue to the tribes).
256. 501 U.S. 755 (1991).
257. Id. at 782; accord Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,
756 (1998); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 268-70 (1997).
258. See supra Part IV.A.2.; Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756-57.
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them upon their recognition."9 Meanwhile, state immunity rests on the
Eleventh Amendment. States entered the Union on more or less equal
footing with each other and the federal government, and thus would be
accorded more consideration than tribes in this regard.
B. Why Sovereign Immunity Is Wrong in This Area
Sovereign immunity is a very dangerous doctrine and a very
questionable litigation tool. It allows the government to escape liability
for its illegal conduct. On the one hand, sovereigns must have the right
to act in governmental ways that will not constantly subject them to
potentially frivolous damages suits by their citizens that might impede
the flow of government operations. On the other hand, it gives a
government the power to avoid consequences and to injure its own
citizens and those of other sovereigns with impunity. With this
understanding of the potential harm inherent in sovereign immunity, it is
easier to attack the doctrine of sovereign immunity for off-reservation
commercial entities. It is neither an attack on Indians nor on Indian
rights. It is, rather, an appeal to justice. Can the notion that "the king
can do no wrong" really justify sovereign immunity today?
1. The Kiowa Grant Is Overbroad
In its current form, tribal sovereign immunity is too broad.6' There is
simply no justification for allowing a corporation to enjoy immunity
from suit in another sovereign's borders. It extends too far in allowing
the immunity to apply to commercial transactions, and in covering
activities off the reservation; the immunity goes beyond any
"meaningful nexus to the tribe's land or its sovereign functions."26' Such
immunity is broader than that of federal, state, and foreign
262governments.
The Court in Kiowa, claiming its hands were tied, almost begged
Congress to take note of the breadth of the doctrine. As the Court stated
in Kiowa, "[a]t one time, the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit might
259. For more on the varied history of tribes and their creation and recognition, see
supra Part III.B.2; see also COHEN, supra note 8, at 47-127; CANBY, supra note 10, at 10-
20.
260. See McLish, supra note 30, at 178-79.
261. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 765 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
have been thought necessary to protect nascent tribal governments from
encroachments by States. In our interdependent and mobile society,
however, tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safeguard
self-governance." '263 Furthermore, "[t]he rationale, it must be said, can
be challenged as inapposite to modem, wide-ranging tribal enterprises
extending well beyond traditional tribal customs and activities."
2. The Harm of Such a Sovereign Immunity Doctrine Is Clear
One of the principal arguments against allowing Kiowa immunity is
the harm it may cause others without reciprocal benefits for the tribes.26
While it may, in the short-term, benefit tribes to be able to default on
promissory notes and then simply claim sovereign immunity and refuse
to pay, or to assert immunity when tort victims sue, it significantly
harms those parties that have been denied due process of law as well as
harming the tribes asserting immunity.
The harm to third parties is clear, whether they be contracting parties
or tort victims. If a company contracts to deliver goods to a tribal
corporation, it should expect payment, or at least be able to get back its
goods. Under the current doctrine, it can do neither. Of course, it is
easy to downplay the importance, since the company should have
realized what it was getting into. However, in reality, only those who
have studied Indian law would realize that the tribal corporation enjoys
sovereign immunity and would understand the waiver requirements. In
United Linings v. Vi-ikam Doag Industries, Inc.,"' both the company and
its attorney were surprised when its claim could not be heard, and the
attorney even advanced a theory of fraud, i.e., that the tribal corporation
had committed fraud by not revealing its immunity, and should therefore
be subject to suit on some sort of equity basis.27 Needless to say, this
argument did not work. A government action like this seems to amount
to a taking without just compensation, in violation of the Takings
Clause, which is effective on tribes via the ICRA.2" But the tribe can
263. Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 757-58.
265. For some of the potential areas of impact of the doctrine, see supra Part IH.C.
266. No. 324116 (Ariz. Super. Ct. July 13, 1998).
267. See Application for Issuance of Provisional Remedies Without Notice at 2,
United Linings, Inc. v. Vi-ikam Doag Indus., Inc. (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1998) (No. 324116).
"The fact that activity of VI IKM [sic] DOAG INDUSTRIES is outside the jurisdiction
of the United States, the fact that VI IKM [sic] DOAG INDUSTRIES has refused to
secure UNITED LININGS and does not have sufficient assets with which to pay its
debts, constitute a defrauding of the creditors" of the tribe. Id. For more on this case,
see notes 1-3 & 5 and accompanying text.
268. 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1303 (1994).
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still assert immunity against such a claim.29
The harm to the Indian tribe has yet to be assessed. It may very well
be that corporations will continue to do business with tribes, while
insisting on waivers. On the other hand, it may be that corporations are
"once bitten twice shy." Fearful of having to contract with unknown
entities and fearful of laws they do not understand, corporations may
decide not to bother hiring an Indian law expert just to figure out the
terms of a single contract. This will leave both parties without the
business they wanted.
Although states themselves have been less than accommodating to
tribes within their borders, it is true that the doctrine stands to harm
states in an unfair way. States are effectively preempted from governing
within their own territory. ° This means that states may assess but might
not be able to collect taxes that they levy on all within their borders.27 '
Furthermore, it means that states are confronted with entities doing
business within their borders over which they have no control. Such
corporations could potentially rent property and not pay for it, and their
workers can commit torts, with no repercussions on the tribal
corporation. Suppose that the state passed a law automatically waiving
sovereign immunity for any entity doing commercial business within the
state (but outside tribal borders). Suppose then that the tribal
corporation not only did business within the state but even had obtained
a license to do business there. Would tribal immunity preempt the
waiver, and would an express waiver be required? Under the Supreme
Court's strict readings of waiver, that might be the case.
The primary harm, of course, is to those caught unaware: tort victims,
employees, visitors to the reservation, and others. As the Kiowa Court
recognized, "[i]n this economic context, immunity can harm those who
are unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal
immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort
victims."272 It is hard to say whether tribes actually benefit from
potential harm to such individuals. It may leave entities free to hire and
fire whomever they want. It also leaves tribes less fearful of a crippling
269. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,59 (1978).
270. For further analysis of the state preemption issue, see Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 765
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a more thorough analysis is required to preempt
states in the Indian law context).
271. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
498 U.S. 505, 514 (1991).
272. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
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lawsuit, although liability insurance and separation of the corporation
and tribal government should handle that. Finally, tribes can choose to
ignore claims by visitors to the reservation; however, the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act and IGRA already have
provisions covering this.273
3. Kiowa Contradicts Sovereignty Law Trends
The tide of sovereignty law in the United States has been turning away
from absolute immunity from suits, and has been heading toward more
responsibility to its citizens. 4  While nations still maintain their
sovereign status as against other nations, in the United Nations, for
example, the federal government and the states have yielded their
sovereignty and allowed suits on matters ranging from torts to civil
rights violations. Of course, such sovereign bodies still maintain their
sovereignty when it is in their best interest, and, in some respects, when
they can get away with it. For instance, states still maintain their
sovereign status as against tribes.25 However, sovereign bodies in a
democratic society are compelled both morally and politically to pass
laws giving up sovereignty. In short, voters may have control over the
power of the sovereign. The same does not hold true for tribes. They
have maintained their sovereignty whenever they can, in part because
they fear further encroachments, and in part because they fear economic
consequences. Those most likely to sue a tribe are not its own members,
but those outside it, i.e., those who do not vote in its elections.
Therefore, political will has not been exerted in this way. Yet tribes
cannot deny the anomaly that has been created: they enjoy broader
immunity in United States courts than state, federal, and foreign
governments.
4. Equity
The equity argument clearly cuts both ways. Tribes may resent
encroachment of any sort into their affairs, and with the federal
government already guilty of mismanagement and neglect and with
tribes suffering in poverty, it would be easy to understand why tribes
want to retain and even extend immunity.
However, governments and their corporations should be held
273. See 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c) (1994) (providing for mandatory liability insurance);
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(iii) (1994) (providing jurisdiction to the Secretary of the
Interior to enforce procedures under the IGRA).
274. See supra Part III.
275. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,47, 55-73,76 (1996).
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accountable for their actions. "[T]he rule is unjust. This is especially so
with respect to tort victims who have no opportunity to negotiate for a
waiver of sovereign immunity; yet nothing in the Court's reasoning
limits the rule to lawsuits arising out of voluntary contractual
relationships."276  Retaining immunity allows for no remedy. If the
Constitution applies on reservations, why should standard remedies not
also apply? Otherwise, tribes are simply provided with a windfall,
obtained in violation of the rights of another party.' 7 One attorney, in
his pleadings, sarcastically commented that his clients had effectively
made a charitable donation to the tribe in the form of goods delivered.28
Such unintended donations are hardly equitable, and are evidence of a
government that is unwilling to be held accountable for its conduct.
Perhaps tribes feel justified in doing so, given the failures of the federal
government to live up to its agreements in the past. However, it is hard
to say that this justifies failing to provide remedies for innocent,
uninvolved parties.
5. The Supreme Court Is Legislating
Sovereign immunity for tribes is the Supreme Court's rule, not a
Constitutional command, and it is the Court's obligation to justify its
expansion. The Court effectively legislated, rather than merely
interpreting, when it expanded the doctrine into areas in which tribal
immunity has never before been applied. This can hardly be gap-filling,
since that would assume a default rule of absolute sovereignty of tribes,
even in the domain of other sovereigns. In other words, the Supreme
Court in Kiowa is claiming that it is merely applying an already-existing
absolute sovereign immunity, but such expansive immunity did not exist
until the Court decided this case. Furthermore, does the fact that
Congress didn't speak necessarily authorize another branch of the
government to do so? It is doubtful that it is the Court's prerogative to
speak and then let Congress strike down whatever the Court got wrong.
Simply having good reasons for a doctrine is not enough. The Court
276. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 766 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277. See McLish, supra note 30, at 192-93 (stating that tribes are gaining an unfair
windfall).
278. See Response and Opposition to Defendant's Application for Attorneys' Fees
and Costs at 2, United Linings, Inc. v. Vi-ikam Doag Indus., Inc. (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1998)
(No. 324116). "Since [United Linings] did not feel it was fair that they should be
required to donate the materials, they chose to initiate litigation." Id.
would have to derive the power to establish and enlarge upon the
doctrine through some specific source, which it does not appear to have
done."9
"[It is quite wrong for the Court to suggest that it is merely following
precedent,""0 because the line of cases before Kiowa had allowed
sovereign immunity only for issues arising on reservation land
concerning tribal matters." In fact, its own cases had previously
suggested that it would not extend immunity to off-reservation activity.
For example, in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 2 the Court held that
"[a]bsent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond
reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to
nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the
State." 3  This indicates that the federal government does not have
exclusive jurisdiction over the tribes; states may apply their rules in
certain instances. However, Kiowa appears to erase that possibility and,
in effect, insert the Supreme Court's will in the picture. According to
Justice Stevens,
By setting such a rule, however, the Court is not deferring to Congress or
exercising "caution[]"... -rather, it is creating law. The Court fails to
identify federal interests supporting its extension of sovereign immunity-
indeed, it all but concedes that the present doctrine lacks such justification...
-and completely ignores the , ate's interests.... Stronger reasons are needed
to fill the gap left by Congress.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Recommendations
The Supreme Court has basically mapped out a strict doctrine of
279. For further discussion of possible sources for the Supreme Court affording
sovereign immunity to tribes, see McLish, supra note 30, at 181 (concluding pre-Kiowa
that the Court has no valid authority).
280. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. For this argument, see Oral Argument of John E. Patterson, Jr., On Behalf of
the Respondent, Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (No. 96-1037), 1998 WL 15116, at *32
(Jan. 12, 1998). Patterson stated, "[t]he cases which amount[] to the general rule that the
tribe is not subject to suit absent its waiver or a congressional abrogation of immunity
arose historically out of cases where the tribe was acting in proper tribal matters on a
tribal reservation, on land." Id.
282. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
283. Id. at 148-49. The Kiowa dissent uses this as a key argument. See Kiowa, 523
U.S. at 760 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game,
391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75-76
(1962).
284. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 765 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sovereign immunity. Those who must deal with the immunity must
either accept it, try to go around it, or ask Congress to change it. Those
most affected include: courts dealing with a tribal corporation that
refuses to be sued; businesses that see opportunities but do not want to
take risks; states that must work with tribes; employees of the tribal
corporations; and tort victims. Primary recommendations include
expansion of the waiver doctrine; expansion of the Dixon doctrine;2' and
allowing the ICRA to provide a platform for lawsuits. In addition,
businesses and states may take action before problems begin by prior
negotiations.
The Supreme Court has left little room for waiver of immunity. A
more sensible doctrine would allow for automatic waiver under certain
circumstances. The widest form of waiver would state that any tribal
corporation doing business off the reservation automatically waives
immunity by submitting to the laws of the sovereign state in which it is
doing business. This is not unlike the law under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA),"6 and allows the tribe to remain sovereign in its
own realm while requiring it to yield immunity if it chooses to enter
other areas (though, obviously, the tribe could contract for immunity).
Such a use of waiver was raised in questioning by the Supreme Court
during petitioner's oral argument in Kiowa.28 The FSIA also includes
waiver for any commercial enterprises, i.e., for those actions not taken in
furtherance of governmental functions. This seems like a sensible
distinction to make.
In many cases, the actions or statements of tribes cause others
reasonably to believe the immunity has been waived or that the tribe has
agreed to waive it. Such conduct should be upheld as a valid waiver.
For example, where a contract with a tribe contains an arbitration clause,
a party signing the contract would reasonably assume that the other
contracting entity would be willing to abide by the ruling of the
arbitration hearing, e.g., if the ruling found the contracting tribal entity
285. See Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104 (Ariz. 1989); see supra Part
II.D.
286. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f),
1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). The Act states that courts will have
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns involved in non-governmental commerce. For
example, a bank owned by China would not have sovereign immunity in its business
dealings.
287. See Oral Argument of R. Brown Wallace, Esq., On Behalf of the Petitioner,
Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (No. 96-1037), 1998 WL 15116, at*8 (Jan. 12, 1998).
negligent. Distributing an employee handbook that includes grievance
mechanisms would likewise cause an employee to assume that such
procedures could be followed and that the tribe would uphold the results
of such procedures.29 Waivers should also be found when a tribe sues
someone in non-tribal courts, especially because of mandatory
counterclaim rules. Finally, the actions of a tribe in inviting
nonmembers onto the tribal property to ski and gamble would cause
such individuals to believe that they could sue for negligence or
recklessness, since visitors might believe the tribal duty to be the same
as the duty held toward visitors by non-tribal businesses. Tribes do,
however, often post signs that notify visitors of the lack of liability,
which seems fair.
In a sense, such waivers could also be seen as waivers by
nondisclosure. Seen in this light, nondisclosure is fraud, particularly in
light of the presence of sue-or-be-sued clauses and other clauses that
appear to waive immunity without actually doing so. Nondisclosure
gives tribes a serious informational advantage, since it allows them to
contract with full knowledge that the other party bears all the risks of
nonperformance and market problems. Such an informational advantage
should not be allowed. 9
Relying on such implied waivers is risky, however. Barring federal
legislation, it is still up to the courts to determine how strictly they will
interpret any waivers. So far courts have been very strict. Those doing
business with tribes or their corporations, or working for them, will have
to insist upon carefully worded waivers. 2 ' Fortunately, some tribes have
had the foresight to take actions like creating corporations that waive
sovereign immunity and maintain liability insurance, which helps the
corporations do business while not allowing judgments to pierce the
corporate veil to reach the assets of the tribe itself.2Y Insisting on
express waivers in dealings with tribes that have not taken such actions
may prove problematic, however. To start with, it raises transaction
costs, because the clause must be negotiated into every contract unless
the tribe has already waived it for the corporation. If a non-tribal
corporation is insistent on the waiver, the tribe may assume that the
other party plans on suing, and may be hesitant to continue doing
business. After all, the other party may begin requesting all sorts of
terms, like requiring the tribe to submit to the jurisdiction of non-tribal
288. See, e.g., Burnham v. Pequot Pharm. Network, No. CV 95536264, 1998 WL
345463, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 1998).
289. See generally Lake, supra note 11, at 99-104.
290. See Zeh & Heame, supra note 26, for some examples of those waivers that
work and those that do not.
291. See id.
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courts. Meanwhile, the non-tribal corporations may eventually be
unwilling to do business at all without such a waiver. This could
become a sticking point every time the parties come to the table. In
addition, casino employees, school teachers, and ski instructors may not
be in a position to make demands of the tribe, some of which already
request that such individuals themselves sign waivers.
States are unlikely to get clear waivers from tribes. Thus, they will
have to approach tribes to negotiate many matters concerning taxation,
land use, fishing, and hunting. "States may... enter into agreements
with the tribes to adopt a mutually satisfactory regime for the collection
of... tax[es]." 29 States may find tribes unwilling to cooperate, since
tribes are still growing and may not want such intrusion into their
economic affairs. However, both groups have reasons to want to work
together. States may also take other actions to collect taxes. According
to the Supreme Court in Potawatomi: "[s]tates may of course collect the
sales tax from cigarette wholesalers, either by seizing unstamped
cigarettes off the reservation, or by assessing wholesalers who supplied
unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores."293 States may also be forced to
take the Supreme Court's suggestion in Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation294 to heart: seize cigarettes
before they ever get to the reservation, and thereby satisfy their claims. 93
States might be able to sue individuals over the tax issue as well, since
the Supreme Court has "never held that individual agents or officers of a
tribe are not liable for damages in actions brought by the State.' '296
The negotiation process still leaves one group out: tort victims, since
they cannot contract ahead of time to avoid their situations. If many
people realize the dangers, perhaps they will avoid ski lodges and
gambling casinos altogether for fear of accidents. It is unlikely,
however, because individuals will not be checking the charters of
corporations and tribes to determine if sovereign immunity has been
292. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 514 (1991).
293. Id. (citations omitted).
294. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
295. See id. at 161-62 ("We find that Washington's interest in enforcing its valid
taxes is sufficient to justify these seizures.... It is significant that these seizures take
place outside the reservation, in locations where state power over Indian affairs is
considerably more expansive than it is within reservation boundaries.").
296. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514; see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(setting forth the doctrine allowing suits to enjoin government officials from continued
infringements of law).
waived and if proper liability insurance is carried. Individuals are the
most unlikely to realize that a corporation could even be immune from
suit.
Courts have been unwilling to abrogate sovereign immunity even
when an off-reservation tort is at issue. The Dixon 97 court came up with
a clever method that courts could expand upon, since the Supreme Court
has not approached this particular subject. In holding that the tribally
created corporation could be held liable and did not have sovereign
immunity for an off-reservation tort, the Dixon court held that the
corporation did not have close enough ties with the tribe to qualify as a
"subordinate economic organization"298 of the tribe. Courts can look to
factors such as whether the corporation was "formed to aid the
Community in carrying out tribal governmental functions"2' and
whether it has "a board of directors, separate from the tribal
government, which exercises full managerial control over the
corporation '" that doesn't have to be "selected from among Community
officers or even members. '0 '
Courts, individual tribes, businesses, and individuals, however, can
only have a limited effect on the doctrine. Congress, ultimately, would
have to act in order to foster business transactions and fair solutions for
victims.3Y2  It could expand the waiver doctrine, require tribal
corporations to carry liability insurance, as it requires under the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Act,0 3 or allow suits under the ICRA,
particularly the Takings Clause of the ICRA.Y
Congress should also allow causes of action under the Due Process
clause. According to the ICRA, "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of
self-government shall-.... (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of is laws or deprive any person of liberty or
property without due process of law."' 5 Courts have held that "person"
in the ICRA includes both Indians and non-Indians.Y6 However, the
297. Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104 (Ariz. 1989).
298. Id. at 1109.
299. Id. at 1110.
300. Id. at 1109.
301. Id. at 1108.
302. For specific statutory suggestions, see Lake, supra note 11, at 107-16 (favoring
a limitation on the immunity); Dietrich, supra note 10, at 127-32 (favoring maintaining
the immunity).
303. See 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c)(3) (1994).
304. The Takings Clause of the ICRA states that "[n]o Indian tribe in exercising
powers of self-government shall.., take any private property for a public use without
just compensation." 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5) (1994).
305. Id. § 1302(8) (1994).
306. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 n. 6 (1978);
Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 24 (D. Ariz. 1968); 41 AM. JuR. 2D Indians § 13
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Supreme Court has held that no suits may be brought under the ICRA
except for writs of habeas corpus." Although ICRA suits can be
brought against tribal officials in their official capacity, this may not
provide an adequate remedy, since such suits cannot necessarily be
brought in federal court."° In addition, to help tort victims, Congress
should expand the Federal Tort Claims Act to include tribal
governments. It clearly has that power under the Constitution."'
Finally, over twenty years ago, the Supreme Court indicated that it
would not expand tribal sovereign immunity into certain areas. In
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,31° the Court stated that such
immunity would be limited "so as not to conflict with the interests" of
the United States.31' Furthermore, tribes retain all sovereign powers
except those "expressly terminated by Congress" and those "inconsistent
with their status. '312 Arguably, when a tribe creates a corporation, and
that corporation does non-governmental business off the reservation, and
then refuses to settle legitimate claims or pay legally-imposed taxes, it is
acting inconsistently with its status, in a way that conflicts with the
interests of the United States.
Furthermore, if Congress is unwilling to pull off the "band-aid" of
sovereign immunity in one painful action, it can provide other remedies.
(1995).
307. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-60 (1978) (holding that a
tribal member could not bring an Equal Protection claim, since the ICRA had not
specifically waived tribal sovereign immunity to suit; however, a claim against a tribal
official was not barred by a tribe's sovereign immunity).
308. See id. at 59-62. Justice White pointed out that denying federal forums might
contradict Congressional intent to protect individuals from tribal governments. See id. at
72-74 (White, J., dissenting). In addition,
[In the absence of any right to enforce ICRA rights in federal courts, the
refusal of tribal courts to honor them is difficult to address in the federal court
system. Martinez, in sum, recognizes the responsibility of Indian tribes to
adhere to the substantive requirements of the ICRA and concludes that
Congress intended, in deference to tribal self-government, to remove federal
courts from overseeing tribal compliance with the ICRA except in habeas
cases or unusual circumstances.
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DEsKBOOK 158 (Nicholas J. Spaeth et al. eds., 1993). In other
words, federal courts may oversee state courts and governments, but not those of tribes.
No explanation is given for this anomaly. Note also that tribal courts have split on
whether claims can be brought under the ICRA and whether they are barred by sovereign
immunity. See id. at 163-65.
309. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
310. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
311. Id. at209.
312. Id. at 208 (emphasis omitted).
It can, of course, waive it in certain instances, but that might prove time-
consuming for Congress. Congress certainly would be unwilling to
analyze specific state, contract, and tort claims to determine if they
might merit waiver. It could instead provide for qui tam actions.31
Under this theory, since the federal government could sue tribes at any
time, it may permit entities to sue on its behalf. Although the Supreme
Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida"4 held that Congress could not use
the IGRA to delegate its right to sue states to tribes, this holding does
not apply to states or individuals suing tribes. The Seminole Tribe
holding rested on the fact that states are sovereign under the Eleventh
Amendment."5 Basically, because of the unique nature of tribal
sovereignty, Congress would clearly be permitted to waive sovereign
immunity or delegate the right to sue. Although the Supreme Court has
said Congress cannot delegate such power to sue with regard to state
sovereign immunity, the sovereignty of tribes is clearly distinguishable,
as it is entirely under the purview of Congress.
B. Conclusions
Clearly, the primary remaining issue is whether Congress will in fact
act to remove the court-created sovereign immunity for tribal
corporations doing non-tribal business off the reservation. On the one
hand, Congress may not feel pressure to do so given the ease with which
such immunity can be contracted around. Large lobby groups like those
controlled by oil companies do not have much to gain if they already
insist on waiver clauses with tribes; they already have the financial
power to deal on an equal plane with the tribes and their corporations.
However, Congress may eventually feel enough pressure from states and
from those doing business with tribes (either contractually or by entering
tribal land) to take action. If enough individuals enter tribal land to
purchase cigarettes, ski, or gamble, or if enough employees run up
against the sovereign immunity wall, Congress may begin to take notice.
After all, even though tribes react to economics and not the results of the
voting booth, Congress must listen to both.
Already, movement has been made by Congress, but no results have
been reached. As early as 1988, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced
legislation which would have waived tribes' sovereign immunity to suit
313. Qui tam actions allow one to sue on behalf of the government in a suit in
which only the government would ordinarily be entitled to sue. See BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
314. 517 U.S. 44(1996).
315. See id. at76.
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in federal court. 16 Extensive hearings on immunity were held in 1996.
A 1997 bill, which passed the Senate, would have waived immunity
under certain circumstances. However, that provision was removed on
the grounds that the hearings would be held in 1998 by the Committee
on Indian Affairs of the Senate.
317
Finally, the Supreme Court obviously is unlikely to take any action in
this area. Although it has initiated and extended sovereign immunity for
tribes "almost by accident," '18 it prefers to wait for Congress to correct
its mistakes.
DAVID M. LASPALUTO
316. See 135 CONG. REc. 3530 (1989), cited in McCarthy, supra note 216, at 466.
317. See Oral Argument of Edward C. Dumont, Esq., On Behalf of the United
States, as Amicus Curiae, Supporting the Petitioner, Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (No.
96-1037), 1998 WL 15116, at *15 (Jan. 12, 1998).
318. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756; see also supra Part IV.A.2.
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